Numéro 6, juin 1999 SUMMARY. Editorial page 2. Message à M. Prodi : signatures page 4. The UK s proposals to reform of the Commission page 5

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1 EUREFORME INFO EUREFORME INFORMATION NEWSLETTER Numéro 6, juin 1999 Nous avons le plaisir de réactiver notre Newsletter en espérant susciter des réactions multiples de votre part. La parenthèse de ces derniers mois était simplement due à l absence d un contexte favorable à un débat ouvert et constructif (démission du Collège, élections syndicales...). D où notre silence, car nous n avons vocation ni à polémiquer sur le comportement politique du Collège, ni à nous ingérer dans le processus d élection des représentants du personnel. Aujourd hui, une nouvelle Commission se met en place et les réformes, plus que jamais nécessaires, occupent déjà une place importante dans son agenda. L esprit de notre démarche reste inchangé: démontrer l existence d un soutien significatif à des réformes réelles, efficaces et mises en œuvre de manière cohérente. SUMMARY Editorial page 2 Message à M. Prodi : signatures page 4 The UK s proposals to reform of the Commission page 5 The results of the notation exercise : we are the best!!? page 7 Points de vue Reforming the Commission : whither collegiality? page 8 by Alain Deckers Organising external relations to succeed page 11 by Eurogoal More about EUREFORME page 14 Association of Reform-minded Staff of the EU Institutions Association pour les réformes des institutions de l UE

2 EDITORIAL Monsieur ou Madame le Vice-président aux réformes, bon courage! Impossible d évoquer ici toutes les rumeurs qui circulent ces jours-ci à Bruxelles sur la composition de l équipe Prodi. Nous nous en tiendrons donc aux propos tenus par le nouveau Président de la Commission devant les chefs d État et de gouvernement à Cologne : un Vice-président en charge de la réforme de la Commission sera nommé, qui pourrait (au conditionnel) cumuler d autres fonctions (contrôle financier, lutte anti-fraude, budget, personnel). Cette décision, ainsi que la nomination d un réformateur reconnu et respecté comme chef de cabinet et la sage intention de se donner quelques mois avant de formuler des propositions concrètes, sont des signes positifs de la détermination de M. Prodi à placer la réforme de la Commission au premier plan de ses préoccupations et de son mandat. Qui s en plaindra? Reconnaissons d emblée cependant qu après tant de déclarations d intentions sur la réforme de l institution depuis sa création, il est difficile de surmonter un certain scepticisme. Disons plutôt, pour ne pas jouer les troublefête, que l attitude dominante est un attentisme circonspect qui ne s effacera que si la détermination affichée débouche sur des décisions perçues comme crédibles et légitimes : crédibilité de la personnalité qui sera nommée; portée du message que le Vice-Président délivrera au Parlement lors des auditions; capacité d écoute et aptitude à détecter les vrais problèmes lors de la définition par ce commissaire de son plan de réformes (octobre-décembre); crédibilité, cohérence et légitimité du plan de réformes qui sera présenté début 2000; ouverture, enfin et surtout, au dialogue durant la conception et la mise en œuvre du plan. Quels seront les indices qui confirmeront (ou infirmeront) la volonté de la Commission Prodi de réaliser des réformes en profondeur? Nomination du Vice-président Un premier indice de la détermination de M. Prodi à prendre au sérieux la réforme de la Commission sera son choix dans l attribution du portefeuille : échoira-t-il, faute de perspectives plus attrayantes, à un désigné volontaire qui l acceptera par dépit, ou au contraire, reviendra-t-il à une personnalité choisie en connaissance de cause, pour sa capacité de dialogue et de négociation et ses compétences en matière de gestion? Force est de constater que le premier scénario à souvent prévalu jusqu ici, lorsqu il s agissait d attribuer le portefeuille du budget et du personnel. Si cela se reproduisait à nouveau, la réforme serait mort-née. Il est inconcevable qu une personne puisse s investir avec succès dans une tâche si lourde si cette dernière devait être acceptée à contrecœur: connaissant la culture maison, les adversaires des réformes se feront entendre bruyamment, tandis que les partisans des réformes (dont nous avons la faiblesse de croire qu ils forment une majorité silencieuse) hésiteront à trop se faire remarquer. En outre, il est toujours plus facile de critiquer que de formuler des contre-propositions constructives donc moins tonitruantes. Certes, en cas de succès, le Vice-Président des réformes pourra rêver à un avenir plus clément dans la prochaine Commission, mais la route vers 2004 sera semée d embûches. Si, en revanche, le futur Vice-président est reconnu(e) pour son expérience de la gestion d une organisation, s il/elle a fait preuve de capacité de dialogue par le passé et si (très important) il/elle s entoure d une équipe compétente connaissant parfaitement le fonctionnement interne de la Commission, alors l attentisme circonspect pourrait se muer en un fragile espoir. Elaboration du diagnostic 2

3 Les premières déclarations du Viceprésident, notamment lors de son audition par le Parlement, seront des indicateurs précieux du diagnostic qu il/elle porte sur les réformes nécessaires. Ils nous permettront ainsi de savoir si il/elle compte s attaquer aux véritables causes des dysfonctionnements (absence d objectifs concrets, manque de responsabilisation sur les résultats, trop faible prise en compte des critères strictement professionnels dans les nominations/promotions). Le Viceprésident disposera de très peu de temps pour saisir les problèmes et définir les principes de son action. Il lui faudra également trouver des early-wins et des symboles lui permettant d obtenir le soutien de l opinion publique, des Etats membre et du Parlement, sans pour autant se laisser enfermer dans des propositions démagogiques. Il s en trouvera donc fortement dépendant des briefings qu on lui servira. Ceux-ci pourront véhiculer des appréciations très différentes de la réalité selon leur auteur : depuis la perception du statut comme l obstacle fondamental à tout changement jusqu à la diabolisation des intentions des Etats membres comme prétexte à ne rien changer. Pas facile de se faire une opinion Dans ces conditions, l attitude la plus prudente sera probablement de se concentrer sur la méthode et de reporter le débat sur le fond à la présentation du plan de réformes quelques mois plus tard. Détermination sereine ne veut pas dire précipitation. Conception du plan de réformes L audition du Parlement achevée (et même dès celle-ci!), il faudra bien rentrer dans le vif du sujet : quelles réformes, pourquoi et comment. Il peut exister de bonnes raisons de reprendre les choses à zéro, mais il ne faudrait pas non plus ignorer l existant : rapport Williamson, rapports du Comité des sages, leçons de SEM 2000 et de MAP 2000, exercice Decode, l image pas toujours positive de la Commission dans les médias, etc. (sans oublier les contributions d EUREFORME!). Mais ce sera surtout le style et la méthode d élaboration du plan qui détermineront le degré d adhésion qu il suscitera. En réalité, la tâche n est pas insurmontable: il suffit de s écarter point par point de la méthode suivie pour le rapport Caston! Vaste programme Mais qui ne serait pas partant pour relever un défi aussi passionnant : renforcer la légitimité d une institution-clé pour la réalisation d une Europe élargie, prospère et vivant en paix. Monsieur Prodi, Monsieur ou Madame le Vice-président aux réformes, de grâce, ne nous décevez pas. Bon courage et... bonne chance! 3

4 Message à M. Prodi : signatures! A l époque de la démission de la Commission, nous avons trouvé inquiétant le nombre de déclarations publiques qui faisaient une lecture dangereuse et inexacte des raisons de la crise : il faut revoir complètement le statut des fonctionnaires, le personnel s oppose à discuter des réformes, etc. Face à ces affirmations simplistes et/ou malintentionnées, la résolution de l Assemblée générale du personnel du 10 mars nous a semblé de nature à leur donner raison plutôt qu à les démentir (nous avons essayé, sans succès, de prendre la parole à cette Assemblée où, de surcroît, le vote a eu lieu sans que les participants ne disposent du texte de la résolution). C'est ainsi que nous avons estimé opportun d adresser au futur Président un message soulignant les réformes organisationnelles nécessaires et les principes qui doivent les guider. Nous avons soumis ce message au personnel par route 400 le même jour de la nomination de M. Prodi, le 24 mars collègues ont marqué leur soutien au message, ce que nous avons fait savoir par écrit à M. Prodi le 12 avril. Le 13 avril, lors de sa première allocution devant le Parlement, il a cité les mêmes principes que ceux contenus dans notre message (responsabilisation, transparence, efficience). Loin de nous d y voir une relation de cause à effet car ces principes sont assez évidents, mais cela a permis de démontrer à M. Prodi qu une partie non négligeable du personnel partage ces principes. En toute transparence, nous tenons à préciser qu il y a eu 41 réactions négatives dont nous vous présentons un échantillon représentatif ci-dessous. En essayant de court-circuiter les structures légitimes de représentation du personnel, vous ne rendez service à personne, sauf peut-être à Liikanen, Smidt, et autres personnalités du même gabarit. Si vous voulez vraiment participer à la défense du personnel et de l institution, arrêtez de vous cacher derrière un PC et une association de jeunes cadres dynamiques (tous A, tous jeunes, tous ambitieux). Arrêtez de jouer à côté de l Administration. Les messages d un briseur de grèves ne m intéressent pas. Si vous n êtes pas content de votre statut, vous et votre clique de pseudo-réformistes, arrêtez de cracher dans la soupe : démissionnez! Le message que vous tentez de faire passer, trop vite et pas assez réfléchi dans un moment aussi grave, risque plus de brouiller les cartes que d aboutir. 4

5 The UK s proposals to reform the Commission Tony Blair pushes very actively the reform of the Commission. The text here below is the one he presented to his colleagues in the Berlin summit last March. EUREFORME does not endorse this paper, but we think it is useful to disseminate it in order to be aware of the ideas circulating among European decision-makers. The next European Commission: Efficiency Through Management Reform The crisis is an opportunity for root and branch reform. To build a successful Europe for the future we need to undertake far reaching reforms of the European Commission. This note sets out key objectives for the reform process. A Commitment to Reform from the New Commission President The European Council decision on the nomination of the President of the Commission will be a critical step in the reform process. The new President will need to be personally committed to achieving reform. One of the Commission s Vice Presidents should have responsibility for reform of management, personnel and budgets. Key Reform Priorities: Structure, Personnel and Management (i) A Transparent and Effective Management Structure In order to deliver its objectives more efficiently, the Commission s management structure needs radical change. Promotion to all levels must be and be seen to be transparent and based on proven ability to do the job. The grade structure should also motivate capable and experienced staff, allowing upward mobility between grades. The roles of different positions in the hierarchy need clarification, with the presumption being that more responsibility should be delegated, accompanied by clear targets. There are too many senior staff. Grades A1 and A2 should be merged, and the number in the new grade progressively reduced. Outside consultants should advise on how best to achieve a more focused and costeffective senior management. Staff resources at every level ought to be more mobile, within and between DGs. This could be organised centrally, in order to allow the Commission to respond most quickly to policy priorities. A wide-ranging external audit to modernise financial management systems and improve financial control and audit, in co-operation with the European Parliament and Court of Auditors, should be commissioned, to report within six months. (ii) Reform of Pay and Personnel Policy: a Focus on Objectives In order to get the best out of its staff, the Commission needs to reorganise merit and reward it within a professional career structure. The high standards of integrity and fairness in the Commission s recruitment system should be maintained. The Commission must attach the highest possible priority to equal opportunities in the recruitment, management, and promotion of staff. A comprehensive strategy is needed for ensuring not just the equal treatment of women and men, but also for the disabled and ethnic minorities. Once in post, officials should be aware of their personal job objectives, and 5

6 how they fit into those of the unit, DG, and organisation as a whole. Job objectives should be regularly reviewed. Appropriate training and personal development should be identified for all staff on a regular basis. Objectives should then be linked to performance, in regular appraisals. Good performers should be rewarded with promotion, but also with financial and other non-financial rewards. Within this new structure of accountability consistently poor performance should be identified, corrected, and a fair but effective process for removing unsatisfactory staff should be established. The Commission s remuneration system should be given a thorough overhaul, increasing transparency and ensuring that all salaries are justified in terms of the need to recruit, retain and motivate staff. (iii)more Efficient Programme Management The Commission has accumulated significant responsibilities in programme and project management, which are on the whole discharged well. However, the European taxpayer does not always receive the best value for money from programmes because management systems are insufficiently flexible and open. Improvement in this situation would be significant in removing perceptions of waste and bureaucracy, and combating fraud. The Council and Commission must work together to ensure that the Commission is not given for which it is unsuitable very small projects are a particular source of inefficiency. The Council should therefore pay more attention to the Commission s ability to perform the tasks it gives it, and the Commission, for its part, should say when tasks are not properly thought trough in resource term. Directors-General should be held responsible for efficient management in their policy areas. They should be accountable to the European Parliament and Court of Auditors on their management of Community funds and programmes. Project management must be streamlined, and benchmarked against external best practice. A new system for awarding contracts, based on best available practice and professionally managed, should be introduced. Project monitoring and evaluation need to be given a high priority. A new system of nominating specific officials to report publicly on the execution of programmes would lead to greater clarity of responsibility. The Commission should make more efficient and transparent use of consultants and outside contractors, hiring short-term sources of expertise when needed, without sacrificing the institution s integrity and independence. A Code of Practice on the employment of contractors and consultants should be published to ensure that those values are preserved. Outside appointments can be valuable in developing management culture, and experience of running programme budgets cost-effectively, but need to be made in a transparent and targeted way. (iv) Uncompromising standards of integrity and honesty Commissioners and their staff must maintain the highest standards of honesty, impartiality and professionalism in all their conduct. A more effective approach to fighting fraud requires an independent fraud investigation office. Its Director, with a record of effectively combating out fraud and mismanagement, should 6

7 be appointed at a senior level and operate within the Commission, tasked to oversee the reform process and follow up rigorously any allegation against Commission staff. Directors General and senior managers should be held responsible for ensuring that standards are upheld in their policy areas. Effective disciplinary arrangements under which those who do not meet the standards required of European public servants can be disciplined and if necessary dismissed in a reasonable timescale should be put in place. The staff regulations should be modernised and amended to reflect in full the above changes. Progress in implementing the reform programme should be reported every six months to the European Council and European Parliament. March 1999 The results of the notation exercise : we are the best!!? Given the impressive results of the latest notation exercise, it is a pity that merit is not more seriously taken into account for promotions, otherwise we would soon all be at the top of the hierarchy Dear EuReformist friends and colleagues, I invite you to take a look at the statistics of our latest notation exercise (see dm/232.htm). I think that EuReforme has finally reached its purpose, which is not to be needed anymore. Indeed, after a long year of struggle, thanks to the implementation of MAP 2000, SEM 2000 and numerous codes of conduct and with the collaboration of DG IX, all support directorate in the DGs, and the OSP - the results show that we have the most outstandingly overperforming workforce in all public service (and probably in the world). On average, 6% of us have Outstanding performances, 54% respond to very high standards, 39% are above standards, while less than 1% appear to be below standards (however... there might be a problem with the standards, but this is another story). Therefore, no need for training or mobility (everybody appears to be extremely well suited to his post, apart from a fringe of Bs in DG XVI and ECHO and a couple of A5 in DG XI and XII who are below standards). A problem might appear however for promotions: what a tough competition it will be for promotions in SCIC or DG XXIV, where above 80% of all A4 to A7 reach very high standards pressurising the 10% of A3 who are just above these standards... Also, a problem for upward mobility appears in the Direction Informatique where all A3s (100%) are of very high standards. The data also challenge the Peters principle (in large organisations everyone raises in the hierarchy until he/she reaches his/her level of incompetence) because the average marking univocally increases with the rank of the official. A fantastic opportunity to challenge a century of Anglo-Saxon dominated management theory. Finally, you should really look at this data carefully for your next career moves. According to the mobility rules, I am planning a horizontal career move since it is required to reach a management post (although experience shows that the "updown" moves climbing the hill to the cabinet and jumping down in a management 7

8 position is statistically more relevant). No wonder competition is tough to join DG IA and DG IV: they are the ones with the lowest performing As (45% just above standards) or with the highest expectations/standards. Giorgio Clarotti POINTS DE VUE Reforming the Commission : whither collegiality? by Alain Deckers Reforming the cabinet system will be an important challenge for the incoming college. However, it is not enough to change the size and composition of cabinets. What is needed is a limited number of practical measures to simplify the Commission's decision-making processes and to make them truly collegial. There is a widespread feeling that reform of the way the Commission does business necessarily means reform of the cabinet system. There certainly exist cabinets staffed with competent people who work well, but this is not the issue: the issue is the system itself and the results it produces in general. Cabinets have been criticised on a number of grounds, including their readiness to interfere in the day-to-day operation of departments, to use their position of influence to secure employment or promotion for individuals on the basis of political loyalties and showing bias in favour of the national interests of their commissioner's member state. In some extreme cases individual commissioners have simply used their cabinet to hijack their services to further personal agendas. Most serious of all has been cabinets tendency to usurp the role of the services in the policy process while failing to enforce the principle of collegiality which is supposed to govern the Commission. What can be done to change the current situation? Some may advocate abolishing cabinets altogether. However, in the short term this does not seem realistic: the Commission s decision-making process is so top-heavy that commissioners could not possibly discharge their responsibilities single-handed. Before this can happen, many decisions which are currently handled by the college or by individual commissioners will need to be devolved to the services. Moreover, the problems associated with the cabinet system are a symptom of a broader malaise and should therefore be seen as part of a broader reform programme. Firstly, the outgoing college has been afflicted by a number of structural problems which go a long way towards explaining its downfall. These include its failure to provide political leadership, the weakness of the Santer presidency and the college s unwillingness or inability to exercise effective oversight over individual commissioner s affairs. All in all, this adds up to an effective breakdown of the principle of collegiality. Secondly, there is the sheer volume of work currently facing commissioners and their cabinets. A former cabinet member recently calculated that each commissioner takes about 200 decisions per week. Attending the relevant meetings and keeping track of all the accompanying paperwork occupies most of a cabinet's time. The main problem is that even fairly trivial decisions require the approval of commissioners or even of the whole college. A further problem is the lack of effective arbitration mechanisms to resolve disagreements between the services, 8

9 as a result of which these are regularly referred to cabinets, further increasing their workload. This situation may have been manageable in the past but is no longer so given the continuous increase in the Commission's responsibilities since the late 1980s. This workload has contributed to the college's inability to provide political leadership to the institution. This leads to the third problem. Commissioners must also provide political guidance to the services under their responsibility, subject to the principle of collegiality. This political role is similar to that performed by Ministers in any national government and is essential if the institution is to function correctly. Nor should it cause any problems, provided a clear line is drawn between commissioners' political role and the executive functions of the services. Unfortunately, this has not always been the case in the past. In extreme circumstances, the problem is that precisely the opposite situation has emerged: cabinets end up micro-managing the services under their tutelage while failing to give effective political guidance. What has been the response to these problems? One of the Santer Commission's last acts was to introduce a code of conduct concerning the composition and role of commissioners' offices. Unfortunately, this simply enshrines current practices when what is called for is a thorough reform of the Commission's decision-making processes. More than a code of conduct, what is needed is a limited number of practical measures to simplify the Commission's decision-making processes. Achieving this will require a delicate balance between two apparently conflicting processes: a centralisation of political power towards the college and a simultaneous decentralisation of administrative power towards the services. While the outgoing Commission tried to achieve the latter through MAP2000, it failed to achieve the former. There are in my opinion three elements which the incoming Commission should address: the elaboration of the work programme, the involvement of commissioners in the decision-making process and the relations between the college and the services. The rest of this article outlines how this might be achieved. These ideas are intended to stimulate debate. The Commission s work programme Despite the outgoing Commission's less but better rhetoric, the Commission's work programme has in recent years looked more like a shopping list of initiatives than a coherent political programme. In practice, the absence of a clear political line from the college meant that the services had a large degree of freedom to define their own agenda. This is why Mr Prodi's remarks that the Commission should "increase [its] scope for political involvement, [and] produce a major political programme, focusing above all on certain key priorities" are so welcome. Above all, the elaboration of the Commission s programme should become more top-down than has previously been the case. It is the role of the college and not that of the services to define political priorities which are then translated into the work programme. The president and his cabinet will have to assume the primary responsibility to impose the coherence and discipline required to achieve this. This is the only way to achieve a programme which is both coherent and focused on priorities. The decision-making process Increasing the efficiency of the Commission s decision-making process will not be possible unless the number of decisions requiring the approval of commissioners is greatly reduced. Resolving this impasse will require clear rules about which decisions need to be considered by the college, which can be taken by individual Commissioners through habilitation procedures and which can be delegated to the services. The key point is that there is a need to devolve a lot of the decision-making powers currently controlled by the commissioners and their cabinets. The latter should cease to be the decision-making treadmill they have unfortunately become. Mr Prodi's recognition of the need for "a genuine shift 9

10 in the balance of power from the cabinets towards the Commission's services" is therefore welcome. The responsibility of the services There remains the thorny issue of the relations between cabinets and the services under their tutelage. This is arguably the issue which requires most urgent and radical surgery and one about which the Commission's code of conduct leaves a lot to be desired. Its central recommendation is that "[the commissioner's] policy line shall be set out in a mission statement" and that this is the basis on which the Director- General assumes management responsibility for his or her department. As Dilbert readers know, a mission statement can be a source of endless entertainment but it is hardly an effective management tool. No sensible Director-General should assume management responsibility on that basis. A contract is a more appropriate instrument on which to base the relationship between commissioners and services. Such a contract should set out objectives in a specific, measurable and transparent way and would provide a functional management tool for performance evaluation. In addition, a contract would provide an effective way to link the college's political priorities to the operational activities of the services, thereby protecting the principle of collegiality. How would this work in practice? Once the Commission has identified its political priorities, each commissioner should examine how the services under his tutelage can contribute to their achievement. A draft contract would be jointly drawn up between the commissioner and the head of each service under her tutelage. These drafts should then be submitted to the college for approval. Once they are approved, they should be made publicly available. This will ensure both internal and external transparency. A regular progress report, linked to a quarterly review of the contract, could form the basis of a revamped Bulletin of the EU. This system should not be seen as an additional bureaucratic procedure. It could in fact greatly reduce the paperwork currently requested by the Secretariat General when the work programme is drawn up, thereby giving the services more rather than less flexibility to respond to the college's political priorities. The advantages of this system are that relations between cabinet and service become more transparent and predictable; it becomes easier for cabinets to monitor each other's work and thus easier to ensure collegiality; and it becomes possible to introduce some form of performance evaluation throughout the organisation, thus ensuring that every unit can clearly identify its contribution to the achievement of the Commission's political objectives and evaluate its performance in relation to those objectives. Successfully implementing these reforms will to a large degree depend on the integrity and competence of the incoming commissioners. Making their cabinet s more multinational will also help. However, this is not enough : There is a need to refocus the role of cabinets : they should become the guardians of the Commission s collegiality, and thus of the general interest, rather than the guardians of their master s interests, as they are widely perceived to be at the moment. Organising external relations to succeed Key suggestions made by Eurogoal (*) 10

11 Resources could be allocated in function of political priorities. In this case, the first step would be to decide on priorities. E.g.: - becoming the motor of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP); - developing a clear global image for the EU; - promoting a single EU international economic policy; - building common priorities in aid for Member States and the Commission. All countries that have already applied for EU membership, plus all Balkan states could be put under the responsibility of a Commissioner for Pan-European Integration, to whom report all key services dealing with these countries. could seek to promote a single EU economic identity in the world. The "European Development Department" (DG) could build an integrated process that deals with the whole project cycle once the External Relations Commissioner has indicated the priority countries and sectors to the Development Commissioner. Any new organigramme could be worked out with full bottom-up participation of concerned staff it is to work. (*) Eurogoal is a group of active citizens, many working in and around the EU institutions. It is committed to a democratic, efficient and transparent Europe. Contact person: Adrian Taylor (tel ), web site: When dealing with the rest of the world, a clear division of labour could be established between the three remaining Commissioners. E.g.: - Trade: multilateral trade and international economics; - Development: humanitarian, and implementation of projects; - External relations: CFSP, and all bilateral trade plus priorities in aid. For organisational purposes, the external relations services could be treated as one DG, with a number of common horizontal services and easy movement of staff within this "European Diplomatic Corps" (see organigramme attached). The External Relations Commissioner must carry weight to be useful in CFSP, hence the "European Foreign Office" (DG) could have substantial resources, and handle bilateral first pillar relations. He/she could also control the delegations. The "European Department External Economic Relations" (DG) under the trade Commissioner could deliberately seek to go broader than just trade: it 11

12 A possible organigramme for Commission external relations services 1= Answers to External Relations Commissioner 2= Answers to Trade Commissioner 3= Answers to Development Commissioner 4= Answers administratively to the three DGs, politically to 1 5= Answers to Commissioner for Pan-European Integration European Diplomatic Corps European Foreign Office 1 European Trade Deptartment 2 European Developm Department 3 Rest of Europe (esp Russia) WTO Humanitarian Aid Central services 4 Middle East and Mediterrantean Sectoral Trade Questions Project Management Africa Int. Economic & Financial Instits NGOs and North South Relations Policy Communication North America Anti-dumping Anti-corruption Inspection Delegations Latin America & Carribean Anti-subsidy Budgets & Financial Administration Asia, Oceania and Pacific Economic/industrial co-operation EP Relations International Political Instits Planners Security 12

13 WHAT IS EUREFORME? EUREFORME is an association of Commission staff who support and put forward reforms intended to contribute towards greater efficiency, responsibility and independence in the European public service. We are independent of both the administration and the trade unions, and we are convinced that transparency and staff participation are essential if the reforms are to be successful. EUREFORME INFO circulation This newsletter has been ed to the 2,200 colleagues within the European institutions who have expressed their interest in being informed about our activities. Do not hesitate to circulate it around you. Contact persons Antoine Quero DG XIX Eric Mamer SCR Vicky Knudsen SDT Giorgio Clarotti DG XII Alain Deckers DG III Isabelle Combes DG IB Do you wish to be informed about EuReforme's activities? Do you wish to join EuReforme? Do you wish to be removed from EuReforme's mailing list? Are you changing address? Please send an to: Alain DECKERS (92 348) Internet: The articles of association are available upon request. Please ask Isabelle Combes by . Vos réactions et commentaires nous intéressent. N hésitez pas à contacter Isabelle Combes, Responsable de la publication (58147). 13