Document of The World Bank

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1 Document of The World Bank IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION REPORT (PPFI-P7450 IDA PPFI-P7451 PPFI-P7452 PPFI-P7453 PPFI-P7454) ON A CREDIT IN THE AMOUNT OF US$ 26.5 MILLION TO THE REPUBLIC OF SENEGAL FOR A HIGHER EDUCATION PROJECT Report No: December 22, 2003 Human Development II Country Department 14 Africa Regional Office

2 CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS (Exchange Rate Effective May 1996) Currency Unit = Franc CFA (CFAF) CFAF 1,000 = US$ 2.04 US$ 1 = CFAF 490 FISCAL YEAR ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS CAS Country Assistance Strategy CNES Concertation Nationale sur l enseignement supérieur COUD Centre des Œuvres universitaires de Dakar CPPR Country Program Performance Review DAGE Direction de l Administration générale et de l Equipement DCA Development Credit Agreement DEUG Diplôme d'etudes Universitaires Générales EFA Education for all ESAM Enquête Sénégalaise auprès des ménages FEPS Final Executive Project Summary FRU Fonds de recherche universitaire (University Research Fund) FTI Fast Track Initiative GoS Government of Senegal IEPS Initial Executive Project Summary IT Implementation Team MDG Millenium Development Goals MoE Ministry of Education MTR Mid-Term Review PAES Projet d amélioration de l enseignement supérieur PDEF Programme Décennal de l éducation et de la formation PDRH2 Programme de Développement des ressources humaines 2 PPF Project Preparation Facility PSR Project Status Report SAR Staff Appraisal Report SDR Special Drawing Rights SM Sector Manager SSA Sub-Saharan Africa TM Task Manager UCAD Université Cheikh Anta Diop de Dakar UGB Université Gaston Berger de Saint Louis WID Women in Development Vice President: Country Director Sector Manager Task Team Leader/Task Manager: Callisto E. Madavo John M. McIntire Alexandre V. Abrantes Meskerem Mulatu

3 SENEGAL HIGHER EDUCATION I CONTENTS Page No. 1. Project Data 1 2. Principal Performance Ratings 1 3. Assessment of Development Objective and Design, and of Quality at Entry 2 4. Achievement of Objective and Outputs 8 5. Major Factors Affecting Implementation and Outcome Sustainability Bank and Borrower Performance Lessons Learned Partner Comments Additional Information 26 Annex 1. Key Performance Indicators/Log Frame Matrix 28 Annex 2. Project Costs and Financing 29 Annex 3. Economic Costs and Benefits 31 Annex 4. Bank Inputs 37 Annex 5. Ratings for Achievement of Objectives/Outputs of Components 40 Annex 6. Ratings of Bank and Borrower Performance 41 Annex 7. List of Supporting Documents 42 Annex 8. Supplementary Tables and Charts 43 Annex 9. Borrower's Project Completion Report 51 IBRD MAP 27975

4 Project ID: P Team Leader: Meskerem Mulatu Project Name: HIGHER EDUCATION I TL Unit: AFTH2 ICR Type: Core ICR Report Date: December 22, Project Data Name: HIGHER EDUCATION I L/C/TF Number: PPFI-P7450; IDA-28720; PPFI-P7451; PPFI-P7452; PPFI-P7453; PPFI-P7454 Country/Department: SENEGAL Region: Africa Regional Office Sector/subsector: Tertiary education (100%) Theme: Education for the knowledge economy (P); Gender (S); Social analysis and monitoring (S) KEY DATES Original Revised/Actual PCD: 04/21/1993 Effective: 09/17/ /03/1996 Appraisal: 01/02/1996 MTR: 10/01/ /18/1999 Approval: 06/04/1996 Closing: 06/30/ /30/2003 Borrower/Implementing Agency: Other Partners: GOVERNMENT/MINISTRY OF NATIONAL EDUCATION (MNE) STAFF Current At Appraisal Vice President: Callisto E. Madavo Edward V.K. Jaycox Country Director: John M. Mcintire Birger J. Fredriksen Sector Manager: Alexandre V. Abrantes Ok Pannenborg Team Leader at ICR: Meskerem Mulatu Robert S. Prouty ICR Primary Author: Benoît Millot 2. Principal Performance Ratings (HS=Highly Satisfactory, S=Satisfactory, U=Unsatisfactory, HL=Highly Likely, L=Likely, UN=Unlikely, HUN=Highly Unlikely, HU=Highly Unsatisfactory, H=High, SU=Substantial, M=Modest, N=Negligible) Outcome: Sustainability: Institutional Development Impact: Bank Performance: Borrower Performance: U UN M U U QAG (if available) Quality at Entry: Project at Risk at Any Time: Yes ICR S

5 3. Assessment of Development Objective and Design, and of Quality at Entry 3.1 Original Objective: Introduction The story of the Higher Education Project (Projet d'amélioration de l'enseignement supérieur -PAES) spans over an unusually long period of time. The project was controversial in nature, and had a generally bumpy life. It involved a large number of players and stakeholders, had far-reaching spillover effects, dealt with the often volatile and highly politicized sub-sector of higher education, and took place in a country that is strategic to the West Africa region. Although the project was launched after an extensive stakeholder consultation - and only after key concrete reforms had been completed by the Government in good faith - it nevertheless faced many difficulties. To understand how the PAES unfolded, it is important to first understand the specific contextual circumstances in which it was conceived and implemented -- not only in Senegal and inside the World Bank, but also in the relationship between the Bank and the Government of Senegal. Hence, this report starts with a brief description of the project environment. When project preparation began, the campus of the public University Cheikh Anta Diop of Dakar (UCAD) was in a sheer chaos: university matters were highly politicized, student and faculty protests were frequent, and the whole atmosphere was too confrontational to permit a productive academic life. Preparation for this project also started at a time when tertiary education was not seen as an investment priority by the Bank, especially for countries such as Senegal where enrollments at the primary education level were still very low, and the financial burden of public higher education was very high. Indeed, the World Bank's management considered halting support to the education sector altogether unless major reforms were undertaken at the higher education level. It is in this environment that the Government of Senegal (GoS) launched an exemplary national consultation process with the stakeholders of higher education. Through it, the GoS not only developed a comprehensive reform agenda, but also started to implement some of the boldest reforms in the sector and vowed to undertake additional ones --with Bank support. Together, the consultative process and the reforms undertaken generated great optimism on the Bank side, and provided the justification for a Bank intervention in higher education in spite of the risks involved. This IDA intervention supported the Government s main request: to improve the UCAD library which was seen as having the potential to re-focus the university around academic activities. In addition, the project called for a series of measures which threatened a variety of well-organized vested interests. The combination of far-reaching sectoral reforms based on a relatively narrow investment rationale (library and scientific equipment) turned out to be a built-in hiatus which poisoned the entire project s life, and sowed the seeds for disillusionment on both sides. Project implementation started smoothly, but problems arose very quickly. The ambiguous situation of the project implementation team, and certain opposition of the UCAD leadership prevented many operations from being executed, with the exception of the planned improvements to the university library. The resumption of violent student protests fueled by outside political interests led to a reversal of the many earlier ambitious reforms. Subsequent elections led to a complete change of the political and technical personnel in the sub-sector, and had a further adverse influence on project implementation. These mounting risks put many of the project objectives in jeopardy. Despite early and repeated warnings by Bank staff and the Country Management Unit to suspend the credit, the actual suspension came at a late stage - so late that such action did not have any major technical effect, but rather generated mistrust on the side of the Borrower. This mistrust was further aggravated when the Bank made a last-minute partial cancellation of the remaining credit

6 Objectives Despite some looseness in their definitions, the development objectives of the project were broadly in line with the Bank's Country Assistance Strategy (CAS) and are a direct translation of the country's own priorities expressed at the time of project preparation. (a) Definitions Schedule 2 of the Development Credit Agreement (DCA) lists a threefold objective: to establish an efficient system of higher education with greater cost-effectiveness and more relevance to socio-economic development. In the field of education, the word efficiency has two meanings: internal efficiency (repetition, completion, etc.), and external efficiency (employability of graduates, relevance of programs, etc.). The DCA does not specify which of these two definitions it uses; since, however, the third objective --relevance-- is the main ingredient of external efficiency, the first objective can be interpreted (by default) as internal efficiency. There are two other sources of information regarding project objectives: the Staff Appraisal Report (SAR) and the Project Status Reports (PSRs). None of them uses the same set of development objectives (DO) as the DCA, and each of them proposes different DOs, some long-term and sector-oriented, others very specific and purely investment related (see Annex 8, box 1, tables 1 and 2). In addition, the SAR proposes some "informal objectives." The coexistence of several definitions of project objectives points to some looseness in the project concept itself, and may be a symptom of the aforementioned hiatus. (b) Consistency Alignment with Bank's Country Assistance Strategy (CAS): the project's long-term objectives are broadly in line with the CAS. The CAS strongly linked the country's long-term growth prospects of the country to labor productivity, and made the latter dependent on the development of the "country's human resource potential" --of which, higher education is arguably a central piece. In more specific terms, however, the CAS was calling for savings in tertiary education and for reallocating those savings to basic education - a move which was not explicitly spelled out as an objective of the PAES. Alignment with Borrower's priorities: the objectives are all consistent with the recommendations of the National Consultation which took place during project preparation, and support the reforms subsequently undertaken by the Government with a view to cleaning up the UCAD "social campus" and improving the "pedagogical campus." Project objectives also draw from earlier sector work completed and/or commissioned both by the Bank and the Government. 3.2 Revised Objective: DOs were not formally revised, despite partial cancellation of the credit. After the partial cancellation of the credit in November 2002, the Government and the Bank agreed on a set of limited objectives, listed in the last PSR (March 2003): (i) completion of the university library with additional scholarly books and journals, (ii) purchase and use of laboratory equipment, and (iii) project operating costs, thereby ensuring at least partial attainment of the project objectives. The first two - 3 -

7 limited objectives correspond to component or sub-component outputs, and the third objective was purely intended to keep the project running for the last months of operation. Neither Annex 1 nor Annex 2 of the DCA was amended to reflect the cancellation and the reduction of the objectives. 3.3 Original Components: While there is an overall fit between project components and project outcomes, their match, however, is not perfect. In particular, the impact of a library (by far the most important component) on efficiency is an indirect one. While improvements in the library can be argued to have raised the quality of educational outputs, quality was not listed amongst the project objectives. On the other hand, it is not fully clear how project activities had the potential to make higher education more relevant. Achieving increased cost-effectiveness (the third DO) was more dependent on bold --but risky- sectoral reforms made prior to the project than on the stated project activities themselves. Project components, while largely justified, did not have the full potential to achieve the ambitious objectives assigned to the project. The DCA includes three components and the SAR states a similar set of components (even though it treats the refinancing of the Project Preparation Facility (PPF) as a fourth component, while this is a disbursement category in the DCA). However, the two documents differ at the level of sub-components. Moreover, the components stated in the PSRs are organized in a different manner, combining SAR and DCA components and sub-components (see Annex 8, table 3 and box 2). There is a similar problem with the articulation of project activities. These categorization problems parallel those mentioned with DOs; they are also perceptible in the choice of indicators (see 3.5 below). The components as defined in the DCA are as follows: The Improvement of library services component ($15.6 million, 51 percent of total cost) was to support: (a) the expansion and rehabilitation of the UCAD central library; to that end, the project was to finance: (i) the rehabilitation of the existing central library, (ii) the construction of an additional seating capacity, (iii) the construction of an audio-visual room, (iv) the construction of a workroom for repairing and binding books and periodicals; and (v) the installation of computer networks at UCAD and the University Gaston Berger (UGB) for cataloguing and accessing international databases; and (b) the acquisition of books and periodicals and library management; to that end, the project was to finance: (i) the purchase of 80,000 books, (ii) the publication of 12,500 textbooks, (iii) subscriptions to 1,000 periodicals, (iv) staff training, and (v) incremental recurrent costs for the printing of course syllabi, purchase of CD-ROMs, and database searches. This component is well articulated. It integrates construction, hardware, software, training and services in a combination appropriate to make the library a real pedagogical tool and to contribute to a higher quality of learning. The upgrading of teaching and research component ($9.4 million, 30 percent of total cost) aimed to support: (a) the reinforcement of applied science teaching, by financing: (i) purchase of laboratory equipment, (ii) purchase of teaching materials, (iii) establishment of an incentive-based program for - 4 -

8 maintenance of equipment and replacement of supplies, and (iv) in-service training for faculty staff; (b) the development and testing of an accreditation system (for internal and external evaluation and habilitation of departments and programs), by financing: (i) missions and study tours of accrediting teams, (ii) design and printing of accreditation protocols, and (iii) purchase of equipment and a vehicle; (c) the management of a university research fund (Fonds de Recherche Universitaire - FRU), by contributing to the fund on a matching basis; (d) (e) the study of alternative models for teaching and financing; and the installation of computerized information systems. The activities assembled under this component are disparate in nature. Only the first three sub-components can be seen as contributing to a specific objective (improving teaching and research). The fourth sub-component is particularly heterogeneous: it puts together an economic analysis, a study of distance learning and a functional evaluation of institutions, corresponding, respectively, to cost-effectiveness, pedagogic, and institutional concerns. As to the last sub-component (e), it is strictly a continuation of the library component. The strengthening of management capacity component ($4.1 million, 13 percent of total cost) aimed to support: (a) the reorganization of student services, by financing: (i) the computerization of the Department of Grants and Fellowships, (ii) the rehabilitation of student services buildings, and (iii) technical assistance, and training of staff; (b) (c) the development of a maintenance system; and project administration. Although not fully homogeneous, all activities under this component responded to the need for a better managed university: the first sub-component clearly sought to accompany reforms aimed at improving the situation of social services, the second intended to protect the university's physical capital, while the last one was purely about project operation (with hope of broader capacity-building in the sector). 3.4 Revised Components: Further to the partial cancellation of November 2002, a limited set of activities was retained, concentrating on library services, purchase of books and equipment, and project operating costs. All the remaining activities were dropped. A total amount of SDR 1.1 million was cancelled, out of a remaining undisbursed credit balance of SDR 4.9 million. Several of the activities dropped were transferred to the Quality Education for All Project and/or financed directly by the national budget. Those activities which had been successfully implemented during the course of the project were not penalized and those activities which had not been satisfactorily executed were stopped. Hence, the cancellation was mostly symbolic, and had a limited impact on project activities and their implementation

9 3.5 Quality at Entry: Quality at entry is assessed as satisfactory, although this rating has to be qualified as marginal. On the one hand, this project represented a real breakthrough in preparation activities, considering the difficult context in which these activities were undertaken. In particular, the preparation process was very much country-driven and established a set of coherent and bold reforms that were agreed upon up-front. Moreover, the manner in which the Bank accompanied this process was also exemplary. On the other hand, the project objectives appear to have been overly stretched, and the project may have tried to achieve too many reforms simultaneously. In addition, the investment components -mostly focused on the library- were not carefully connected to the achievement of some of the project objectives. Finally, the political risks linked to the reforms appear to have been underestimated, and the implementation arrangements were not tightened up sufficiently. For these reasons the quality at entry, while satisfactory overall, must be qualified as marginally so. The context (a) In the early 90s, UCAD was in a chaotic situation, marked by student and faculty staff discontent, strikes, and, ultimately (in 1993/94), an année blanche (an academic year without exams). Tertiary education in Senegal was absorbing 33 percent of the education budget (which itself accounted for nearly 31 percent of the overall Government budget). Social transfers accounted for 26 percent of this share, with the rest being mostly devoted to the wage bill. UCAD was attended by permanent students with full scholarships, who were able to live and eat on the university campus without charge, while devoting little time to academic work. Enrollments were growing out of control; internal efficiency was dangerously low, as evidenced by high repetition, absenteeism, and dropout rates; personnel management was deficient, and information management was virtually absent. (b) The Bank had supported the education sector in Senegal through a series of four projects since Yet, none of the first three projects had directly addressed higher education. The fourth project, however (Primary Education Development Project, 1987/94 - "Education IV"- Credit 1735-SE), implemented during a structural adjustment period, started to link primary and higher education in budgetary terms; it projected a reduction of the higher education budget. Yet, the latter experienced a sharp increase, despite this projection. The subsequent project, Human Resources Development Program 2 (PDRH2-1994/ Credit 2473-SE) contributed to: (i) the supply of books for the central library of the UCAD, (ii) building rehabilitation, and (iii) preparation of the proposed PAES. Therefore, the latter activities notwithstanding, the Bank's involvement in the sub-sector of higher education in Senegal was neither prominent nor successful. (c) The Bank s attitude regarding support to the higher education sub-sector at that time could be characterized as hesitant. Unlike primary education, social returns to tertiary education were not deemed sufficient to justify public investment, let alone Bank support. Therefore, in a country like Senegal, which was still far from achieving universal primary education, support for higher education was not an obvious priority. One of the main arguments in favor of a Bank intervention in tertiary education in this case was the proposed reform to generate savings in the sub-sector and redirect such savings to primary education, which badly needed an infusion of additional resources. Ironically, the SAR notes that earlier attempts (through Education IV) to reduce spending in higher education had failed, but does not provide assurance that the new project would fare better

10 The reform package Against this background, the project appears as a pace-maker. Preparation relied heavily on the political process which led to a consensus on the main missions of tertiary education and on the main reforms needed to fulfill these missions. The Bank team facilitated internal stakeholder dialogue by financing the Journées de réflexion (January 1992). Then, the Bank encouraged and supported a two-year long national debate on higher education --the Concertation Nationale sur l Enseignement Supérieur (CNES) launched in April 1992 by President Diouf--. The outcome of this large-scale consultation became the platform of the Bank s intervention. In parallel, the Bank financed a series of studies through advances on the credit which aimed at giving the CNES an objective basis on which to build consensus around reform issues. These studies also helped to design the project. The sectoral reforms upon which the Government agreed included the most critical areas (control of access, reduction of spending, cost recovery, and improvements in teaching). The reform package took into account one main lesson drawn by the OED evaluation of the last two projects in Senegal [Report # 23715], namely that "where strong special interests exist in favor of higher education, conditionalities to reduce expenditures in it prove ineffective". Then, in the case of the PAES, the Bank and the Government together made this reduction a common objective, and the Government quickly introduced appropriate measures to reach the objective (e.g. university dormitories were closed to "permanent residents", and many rent privileges were cancelled). One of the anticipated reforms was to put a cap on absolute enrollments at UCAD; while this reform was implemented for a few years, it turned out to be extremely difficult to maintain because no real alternative venue was offered to qualified students. In addition, the enrollment rate at the tertiary education level in 1995 was only 3.6 percent (versus 4.0 percent in Nigeria and 6.8 percent in Côte d'ivoire). Another reform envisaged was the reallocation of resources from tertiary education to primary education (and from social to academic expenditures). Worldwide experience has shown that this is also an extremely difficult measure to implement, and Senegal was no exception. These two examples of failure in anticipated reforms tend to suggest that the risks associated with the project objectives were underestimated. This unrealistic approach toward political risks may be credited to the general "adjustment mood" which was prevailing in West Africa at the time - and in Senegal, in particular. The institutional set-up of the project Despite the highly political environment of tertiary education, institutional realities did not receive enough attention when designing implementation arrangements, and were left dangerously vague. First, given the relative autonomy of the university, leaving the project implementation unit outside of the key institution was risky. For many years, the Implementation Team (IT) was seen as a foreign entity by the academic community, and personal animosities between the team and UCAD leadership were enough to bring reforms and implementation to a standstill. The prospect of an integration of the IT team into the University administration at the mid-term point of the project may have stimulated further rejection of the team and may have reinforced the lack of project ownership by the university community. A second complication comes from making the project unit accountable only to a steering committee which remained mostly dormant, despite a specific clause regarding the committee in the DCA (Sch. 4, Section 2). Monitoring and Evaluation Two sets of performance indicators are presented in the SAR. A first set (Annex 4A) gives seven - 7 -

11 indicators (inputs, outputs and sector impact), and the second set (Annex 6) provides a list of 15 indicators, derived from the Higher Education Policy Statement of the GoS. The MoE had also developed its own list of 24 indicators. Yet, the PSRs show 10 indicators which were selected from a mix of the abovementioned sources. This multiplicity of sources for performance indicators further underscores the loose connection between the project objectives and components. It is possible, however, to re-categorize all these indicators [Annex 8, Table 4], and to identify the objective to which each indicator refers [Annex 8, Table 5]. It appears that most of the indicators correspond to the objective of enhancing cost-effectiveness or expenditure allocations. The indicators constitute an appropriate tool to monitor progress in these specific areas. Nevertheless, none of the indicators is related to the objective of academic relevance. Further complicating this disconnect, both target and actual figures change from one document to another. Finally, no provision was made to ensure availability of data to estimate the indicators: this problem greatly hindered monitoring and evaluation of the project and quickly engendered continuous tension between the Bank and the Borrower. 4. Achievement of Objective and Outputs 4.1 Outcome/achievement of objective: Achievement of development objectives is considered unsatisfactory, whether assessed against a long-term perspective or against more specific goals, and whether considered through investments or through reforms. This present assessment does not match that provided in the last PSR. The reason for this disconnect is that the Bank team had decided to base its last rating on the objectives actually remaining after partial cancellation of the project rather than on the originally stated objectives. However, the present assessment is more in line with PSR ratings across the entire execution period which rated DOs as unsatisfactory in 10 out of 17 times [See Section 10, Charts 1 and 2]. The overall picture is not uniform, however, and some areas have been more successful than others (see Annex 8, Chart 1). Long-term Objectives The global impact of the project appears to be twofold: (i) through its preparation, the PAES indirectly helped to restore the conditions of a normal academic life, and (ii) through its execution, the PAES directly helped to stimulate the quality of academic services by supporting central functions and critical inputs; this impact, however, is mostly restricted to UCAD. The following review is based on the objectives stated by the DCA, and also incorporates the additional (SAR) objective of gender equity. (a) Graduation Rates: After a timid increase at project outset, graduation rates at UCAD [PSR Indicator #5] plummeted and, in 2001/2002 were less than half the target (30% vs 65%). Graduation rates continuously increased at UGB, where they even exceed MoE's own projections (79% vs 70%), but UGB enrollments represent only one tenth of those in UCAD. Thus UGB's success does not offset UCAD's failure to achieve its objective of a higher graduation rate. In addition, results are variable, both at UCAD [Annex 8, Chart 2], and at UGB, where the number of DEUGs (diploma awarded after 2 years) delivered in 2002 was smaller than in (b) Gender Equity: The actual trend for UCAD follows the expected path toward greater female participation, with only a very slight lag (28.9% vs 30%). Girls' enrollment rate at UGB also - 8 -

12 follows the same pattern (currently at 29.6%). (c) Cost-efficiency: (i) Instead of slightly declining as planned, the student : teacher ratio [PSR Indicator # 6] rose sharply at UCAD, and has recently taken the same trend at UGB; (ii) Faculty teaching load increased by one hour (instead of two as targeted). This was deemed a critical move in efficiency terms, but also a symbolically critical threat to faculty staff; (iii) As the budget has increased more rapidly than enrollments (see below), unit costs have also increased, reaching more than $1,900 per student, or almost 400% of the GDP per capita, which is high, even by Sub-Saharan African standards. (d) Relevance: No indicator was developed to monitor this objective. No comparative data were available to analyze any progress in this regard. "Informal" Objectives These objectives were obviously important to both parties when negotiating the project. Yet, few of them can be considered as being achieved. (a) Refocusing the missions of universities: The resumption of a generous scholarship policy covering both tuition and living costs defies this objective. The shift from a social to a pedagogical campus has not been successful, as evidenced by the share of the total sub-sector budget allocated to scholarships (from 23 to 32% during the project period). (b) Resources: The project also sought to shift savings from tertiary to primary education in order help achieve the MDGs. However, the increase in the share of public expenditure on tertiary education has prevented such a shift from occurring: primary education is currently allocated about 44% of the total education budget, or 6 points short of the Fast Track Initiative (FTI) benchmark to achieve Education for All (EFA). (c) Access: Control of enrollments was another objective sought by the project. Nevertheless, automatic admission to most public tertiary education institutions is granted to all secondary school graduates ("bacheliers"), whose numbers are steadily increasing. Hence, enrollments in higher education are also growing. As UCAD is absorbing a constant share of total public enrollments (about 91%), it means that the freeze of UCAD enrollments envisaged at project outset has not been respected, and has even been grossly breached, in the absence of alternative structures: instead of a targeted reduction of 30%, enrollments have increased by 30% [PSR Indicator #1]. (d) Private sector: The share of private institution enrollments has soared from an already high 15% to an exceptional 29% of the UCAD enrollments, i.e. twice the target, and a very high figure by any standard [PSR Indicator # 8]. However, public oversight of these private institutions is lax and their quality is very uneven: an unknown proportion of these may not qualify to be categorized as higher education institutions. Accreditation or other formalized evaluation systems have yet to be put in place. 4.2 Outputs by components: The main component, focused on the extension of the UCAD library and on the improvement of its operation and utilization is rated highly satisfactory; it constitutes a real success for the project and - 9 -

13 represents a real benefit for its users; the other two components --which are larger in scope and of a more sectoral nature-- have failed on most accounts, and are rated unsatisfactory. The total disbursement rate is 80.2 percent. The first component, "Improvement of library services", is judged highly satisfactory. Indeed, had the project's objectives been exclusively defined around this component, the overall project would have been rated satisfactory. This assessment is based on the following observations: (a) In utilization terms, the daily attendance of the library soared from 500 at project start to about 3,800, and then stabilized at a 3,300/3,400 plateau of users. Library attendance is obviously only a distant proxy of knowledge acquisition, but is however one step toward it. Another indicator of success is the proportion of users having registered with the library [PSR Indicator # 7]; for the last academic year, this proportion was 55.2% amongst students, which seems high, even though there is no baseline figure to put it into perspective. The library has been adopted by its users: there is no problem in collecting the fees to access the facilities and the latter are almost spared from the vandalism which affects other parts of the campus. The fact that less than 6% of the faculty members actually registered with the library is worrisome; it may reflect some form of corporatist resistance. Another more simple explanation is that staff have increased access to internet facilities in their own departments, and therefore do not feel the need to walk to the central library and use its resources. (b) In disbursement terms, this component has an execution rate of percent. It was exempted from the partial cancellation of November The disbursement rate before cancellation was already 95 percent. The exemption facilitated the completion of the last generation of purchase of books and equipment which had been planned. (c) In physical terms, the original building of the UCAD central library was rehabilitated and expanded as planned. New construction includes: (i) Additional seating places, bringing current capacity to a total of This represents a ratio of about one seating place for 18 potential users. The architectural quality of the building is considered to be high; its outside appearance and inside arrangements are appealing, and the library is a landmark of the university, and an obvious subject of pride for the academic community; (ii) the construction of an audio-visual room; (iii) the construction of a workroom for repairing and binding books and periodicals; and (iv) the installation of computer networks at the UCAD and the UGB libraries for cataloguing. (d) In input terms, about 65,000 new books were acquired during the project, and the new order currently being processed will bring the total stock close to the 80,000 target. In addition, 750 periodicals were subscribed to (target of 1,000). Long delays between preparation of the titles and reception of the books have been observed, due to the lack of experience both of university staff in procurement procedures, and of Bank staff in the specificity of tertiary education (small orders, rapid obsolescence). In addition, 126 computers (of which half for public use and half for library staff) and 7 servers were procured and are operational; maintenance is provided under purchase guarantees, but the latter will end by (e) In functioning terms, although classified under the third component, the installation of a computerized information system sub-component was in fact entirely focused on the library. Main

14 activities included: (i) coordination between UCAD library and the satellite libraries in order to synchronize purchases, (ii) standardization of nomenclatures and preparation of a computerized data bank and catalogue, and (iii) common definition of training needs. All these activities were successfully implemented. In 2001/2002, more than 23,000 titles were catalogued (against a target of 20, PSR Indicator # 9). (f) In training terms, the library staff (curators, technicians, administrative staff) received the necessary training to operate the computerized library system. (g) In financing terms, despite these positive aspects, the future of the library is not guaranteed: (i) the 2001/2002 annual (non-salary) budget has allowed the renewal of 330 subscriptions to periodicals, and the replenishment of about 740 books. An additional annual budget of $150,000 is needed to secure the sustainability of this tool, i.e. a renewal rate estimated in the long run at 5,000 to 6,000 titles. Incremental recurrent costs for the printing of course syllabi, purchase of CD-ROM's, and database searches were covered so far, but will also need a special provision. This incremental allocation is not secured; (ii) rapidly growing student enrollments may lead to over-utilization of the library, and subsequent deterioration of the facilities and equipment, needing even more substantial maintenance budget, once guarantees are over. The second component, "upgrading of teaching and research" is judged to be unsatisfactory. The assessment is based on the following observations: (a) The final disbursement rate for the component is 43 percent. (b) Out of the five sub-components comprising this component, only two have been implemented satisfactorily: (i) "reinforcement of applied science teaching", which amounts mainly to procurement of scientific equipment, and accounts for the bulk of disbursements; and (ii) "computerized information systems", which is in fact focused on the library (see above). Other sub-components have failed, and the final impact on teaching and research is frail. (c) The first sub-component "reinforcement of applied science teaching" aimed at giving scientific subjects a better base for teaching through upgraded pedagogical equipment and material. Ultimately, it was to lead to a re-organization of the subjects and programs, with more weight given to scientific disciplines. Electronic, electrical, chemical, optical, audio-visual, construction and office equipment have been delivered to UCAD and several schools; however, the associated establishment of an incentive-based program to organize the maintenance of equipment and to ensure steady replacement of material has not taken place; this is also the case of the in-service training which was supposed to be provided for faculty staff. Hence, the intended re-organization has hardly taken place, and the channeling of students towards scientific disciplines has failed: far from increasing, the share of scientific streams in total UCAD enrollments at entry level (1st year) has shrunk from 17% in 1996/97 to 14% in 2001/2002. Meanwhile, total enrollments in the faculty of liberal arts reached 51%. Indeed, the real root of the problems is to be found upstream, with a majority of secondary education graduates coming from non-scientific streams. (d) Under the second sub-component, "development and pilot testing of an accreditation system", study tours and workshops were organized for faculty staff. The number of accreditations completed was supposed to give a rough indication of how teaching has been progressing. This number is zero, strongly suggesting that there was no progress in the evaluation culture. Apathy and lack of interest from the department in charge of the sub-component and high turnover of staff seem to account for this

15 failure. (e) The third sub-component, "management of a university research fund", promised to be a very innovative activity. Yet, it is the first project activity that was identified by the Bank team as problematic, and it is rated unsatisfactory as early as July 1997, and will remain so until project closing, with the exception of a 13-month period in 1999/2000. The idea behind the Fonds de Recherche Universitaire (FRU) was to stimulate research proposals on a competitive basis. At the time of project appraisal, each faculty staff was automatically granted a study tour every two years without having to produce any evidence of the work performed. The FRU was supposed to redirect the budget for what had amounted to substantial fringe benefits to an instrument aiming at introducing a healthy competition for research funding. The expected outcome would have been to increase scientific publications. The MoE made the funds available for the FRU to function (on a matching grant basis), and some study tours were financed, but the project has been unable to stir the expected behavioral change, and the FRU s intended mission was distorted. The number of research submissions [PSR Indicator #10] was targeted to take off as of 1996/97 at an annual pace of 100, and to reach a cruising rhythm of 400 as of 2000/01. The number of completed proposals was projected to follow the same path, at a 50% level. There is no evidence of any proposal submitted, let alone completed. There are no indicators available regarding the evolution of publications, but no request for support of publications was received. There are three possible explanations for this failure: (i) unions opposed making participation in the study tours subject to concrete proposals and outputs, which they saw as an attempt to cut an acquired right entitlement ("avantage acquis "); (ii) the development of an acceptable operational manual (critical for any funding mechanism) took two years to be developed, presented by the Rector and approved by the university assembly. This was a condition of credit effectiveness which did not take place; and (iii) ex-post justification for study tours were not completed and forwarded by the beneficiaries, bringing IDA matching funds to a halt. (f) The fourth sub-component, "Study of alternative models for teaching and financing" was supposed to help universities develop greater responsibility and financial accountability, through completion of a number of studies and pilot experiences, including accrediting procedures. With the exception of one study and a few training sessions and study tours, this sub-component has not been implemented. (g) The fifth sub-component, "installation of computerized information systems", was implemented satisfactorily, but it concerns only the UCAD and UGB libraries. The third component, "strengthening of management capacity" is considered unsatisfactory. The main reasons for this assessment are spelled out below. (a) The final disbursement rate for the component is 57 percent. (b) One of the main objectives of this component was the improvement of sector management and financing. A set of indicators is needed to assess the extent to which this objective has been achieved. (i) Reducing and then freezing the share of the education budget allocated to tertiary education [PSR Indicator # 2] were seen as a way to keep tertiary education under control, and to make room for primary education. Instead of the projected three-point decline over the period from a baseline level of 23%, the share was 24.1% in 2001/02 (after a peak of 28% the previous year); (ii) Another goal was to free up resources from student aid to make them available for pedagogic purposes; one of the solutions was to reduce the scholarship budget. While the envelope

16 for scholarship abroad [PSR Indicator # 4] did actually shrink throughout, the budget for scholarships in Senegal [PSR Indicator # 3] raised after 3 years of stagnation, further to the decision to award national scholarships or support (aide annuelle) to all students. The end result is an increase of the overall scholarship budget, with an automatic inflationary impact on the sub-sector budget. (c) Despite its title, the first sub-component, "reorganization of student services" was mostly about rehabilitation of student dorms and equipment of Centre des Oeuvres Universitaires de Dakar (COUD) kitchens; rehabilitation has been completed as scheduled. The computerization of the department of grants and fellowship (a prerequisite for a more efficient management of social transfers) was also completed. During project preparation, several spectacular measures had been taken to eliminate most obvious excesses in facilities utilization. A cap was put on both the population admitted to the COUD and on the budget of the latter. As a result, per-student expenditures for meals were stabilized. However, students' participation in the costs of social services remains modest and the burden of these services on the budget remains heavy (expenditures on COUD in 2003 represent 33% of the budget for higher education). (d) The second sub-component, "development of a maintenance system", was supposed to lay the ground for an efficient procurement, maintenance, and space allocation management system; in fact it also included the rehabilitation of the Ecole Polytechnique de Thiès; the latter was not completed, and the former only marginally so. Maintenance expenditures currently represent 0.29% of the UCAD budget. (e) The last sub-component, "project administration", was implemented satisfactorily in terms of disbursement (staff salaries, operating costs and training). However, the performance of the IT was uneven. In addition to the problems related to its position in a no-man's land between the ministry and the university, and to those linked to personal acrimony, the team lacked procurement specialists. In-service and on-the-spot training allowed the IT assistants to eventually handle procurement matters with professionalism, but initial delays were frequent, due to lack of experience. These problems were compounded by a university tender board unfamiliar with Bank procurement procedures, and, at times, by Bank's slow responsiveness. 4.3 Net Present Value/Economic rate of return: Not applicable (See Annex 3 on Economic Costs and Benefits) 4.4 Financial rate of return: Not applicable 4.5 Institutional development impact: Modest. Despite progress in some specific areas, the institutional impact of the project is fragile. The project was expected to bring about improvements in at least four important institutional areas: (i) a tool to channel more students towards scientific streams, (ii) a reliable and transparent system of accreditation, (iii) an organization to ensure facilities and equipment maintenance, and (iv) a competitive mechanism to entice research activities. None of these improvements has taken place. The inability of the Ministry to develop a comprehensive, time-bound, and costed strategy for the sub-sector would also suggest a still limited institutional capacity. Nonetheless, there are some positive aspects associated with the project, including: (i) the establishment of criteria for access to student dorms, (ii) better control of study tours for faculty staff, (iii) the reinforcement of procurement capacities in universities, and in the

17 MoE, and (iv) the involvement of representatives from the private sector in the management of some public higher education structures. 5. Major Factors Affecting Implementation and Outcome 5.1 Factors outside the control of government or implementing agency: Tertiary education stakeholders (students and faculty staff) across the world are typically independent-minded, politically sensitive, strongly resistant to change, and quick to claim their entitlements and to protect them when threatened. This is particularly true in Senegal: the climate in universities was very tense during project preparation and on several occasions during the project implementation period (e.g. the 1997 campus crisis). In Senegal, the academic community is a strong political constituency, holding special relationships with the highest authorities of the country, who, in turn, are cautious to avoid confrontation with this community. These factors strongly influenced project implementation. In addition, some specific factors instrumental in project implementation (such as resource transfers between the COUD and the library) were not under the direct control of the Government, but rather under universities' and related entities' jurisdiction. Presidential and legislative elections in 2000 and 2001, with their associated campaigns and aftermath also created major turbulences, and heightened the fragility of reforms and the vulnerability of implementation mechanisms. The overall macroeconomic situation, which often limits the implementation of projects with high recurrent cost implication, can hardly be called upon in this case since: (i) the project aimed at promoting a decrease of expenditures, and (ii) the annual GDP growth in Senegal fared relatively well between 1990 and 2000 (5.6% vs a SSA average 3.0%). Chart 1 in Section 10 shows PSR ratings over the period, which can be divided into five main episodes: (i) the years 1996/97, which mark the project start, (ii) the 1998/99 period, with the first serious slippages, (iii) the 1999/2000 parenthesis with short-lived improvements, (iv) the years 2001/2002 characterized by policy reversal and subsequent suspension, and (v) the final 2002/2003 period following partial cancellation of the project. The chart illustrates how external shocks and internal events contributed to shape the project's performance over time. 5.2 Factors generally subject to government control: The Government did not make full use of its influence to help create an enabling environment for smooth project implementation, nor did it provide the necessary continuous political commitment to the project's objectives and the leadership--both prerequisites for project success. The Government controls at least two main areas which are seen to have impeded the successful implementation of the PAES, and of the reforms supported by the project: public finance and management. (a) The Government submits annual budgets, and in doing so, it makes key decisions at the inter- and intra-sectoral levels. In particular, allocations to the education sector and those made within it (e.g. to the various sub-sectors such as higher education, then, within the latter, amongst various categories of spending) are the responsibility of the Government. Central government revenues constitute absolute

18 constraints on public spending; this constraint is particularly strong in Senegal, since these revenues accounted for only 18.1% of the GDP in 2001 (versus a SSA average of 23.7%). (b) Likewise, some important technical parameters in higher education, such as the teaching load, are determined by the Government. Finally, the Government retains the power to fill key positions, such as university rectors, and makes personnel decisions directly affecting the project, such as the appointment of the head of the IT, and the constitution of the steering committee. Although the Government s power is limited in each of these three areas by the sovereignty of parliament, the bargaining power of teachers' unions, and the status of universities, it still retains most of the authority in these areas, and that is why it agreed with the Bank to introduce or speed up reforms in each of these areas (e.g. reduction of the share of the education budget going to tertiary education, increase in the number of teaching hours, and assembling an operational implementation team with an effective leader). The fact that several of the agreements were breached and several commitments were not honored (or belatedly so) remains the Government's accountability. Likewise, fulfilling the conditions to lift the partial suspension of the credit was within the Government's control. 5.3 Factors generally subject to implementing agency control: Institutionally vulnerable and technically weak, the implementing agency had little room to maneuver in order to influence implementation beyond purely technical processes. The Implementation Team was inherited from the project preparation period, and had the opportunity to get experience with the series of PPF which supported preparation. Inaugurated with a very small core group of persons (one head, one accountant and one assistant), this team hardly increased in size, even after its integration within the MoE's Direction de l administration générale (DAGE). The lack of managerial experience was a serious drawback, repeatedly pointed out by the Bank team in the early years of the project. The absence of a procurement specialist was also a serious weakness, but was gradually --though partially-- compensated by: (i) successful learning by doing by the personnel, and (ii) sub-contracting all construction aspects to AGETIP, an institution with significant experience in procurement. The 2000/2001 period witnessed almost complete replacement of staff; this major disruption led to the request for assistance from the Quality Education for All Project team. The confusion between the role of accountant and financial specialist (positions held by the same person), and the various errors identified by several documented audit reports were areas under the direct responsibility of the head of the IT. In other areas which are typically under the control of a project unit, such as the preparation of implementation progress reports, the IT did not have authority to obtain the necessary inputs from the various component coordinators, who were hierarchically not obliged to respond to IT's requests. As a result, the IT was often late in issuing and forwarding progress reports. Even in the area of procurement of scientific equipment, the IT was dependent on university committees, which had very limited knowledge of the Bank's procedures. 5.4 Costs and financing: The unsatisfactory level of implementation is not reflected by the relatively high level of disbursement, mostly attributable to spending on civil works, hardware and books, which took an even larger share than projected at appraisal. Likewise, the real impact of suspension and cancellation was not mainly financial

19 Costs: The project's total cost as estimated at appraisal was $30.9 million, and IDA contribution was $26.5 million. The global disbursement rate is 80.2 percent. At appraisal, the library was already the most costly component, with about 56% of the total project cost (there is a discrepancy in the SAR between the figures in the main text and the annexes). However, the cost might have been underestimated, and, at closing, the share of the library costs was 10 percentage points higher than originally anticipated. The analysis of disbursements by categories shows that, in absolute terms, most of the excess spending on this component comes from civil works; however, the largest relative differential between appraisal estimates and actual disbursements is linked to purchase of books and pedagogic material. Conversely, the "teaching and research" component has seen its share reduced from 29% at appraisal to 17% at closing, with the bulk of the 'foregone disbursement' attributable to the very low level of activation of the research fund. Together, civil works and equipment accounted for 62.6% of IDA disbursement, up from 57.1% at appraisal. Financing: With external aid to tertiary education mostly composed of narrowly targeted interventions (notably French, Canadian, Italian, American, Swiss and European cooperation agencies), there were only two sources of financing for such a large project: IDA and the Government. At appraisal, the Government's counterpart was estimated to reach 13.9% of total project cost. By closing, this share had dwindled to 6.8%. A deposit of counterpart funds of $250,000 was a condition of effectiveness which was met without delay. Deposits were regularly made in subsequent years, indicating counterpart funds were not a source of problems. Impact of suspension: When suspension was decided by the Bank (July 2001), $18.3 million had been disbursed already (69.1% of the credit). During the 16-month-long suspension, most activities came to a standstill. Civil works had been completed already. Purchase of books and scientific equipment was put on hold. Grants under the FRU were excluded from the suspension; no withdrawal was made against this category, however. Staff of the IT continued to be paid under the credit during suspension. The main impact of suspension was a deficit of trust, as much as a deficit of funds. Impact of cancellation : When cancellation occurred in October 2002, the undisbursed credit was $8.2 million, out of which $1.5 million were cancelled; therefore, the cancellation may be seen more as the lifting of the suspension, with minor cuts. The latter affected mostly civil works ($0.6 million), the FRU ($1.1 million), and the unallocated category ($1.9 million). On the other hand, allocations for scientific equipment and for books were increased (by $1.4 million and 0.8 million respectively). As a result, procurement of books for the library and equipment for the faculties could resume and partially catch up with the planned amounts. In total, $3.1 million were disbursed following the cancellation. At the time of this ICR, the undisbursed balance was $3.6 million. 6. Sustainability 6.1 Rationale for sustainability rating: Unlikely. The UCAD library --if budgets to maintain and equip it are secured-- should remain a regional showcase for years to come. Few other achievements are likely to be durable. Nevertheless, what the project has not succeeded in promoting --in particular cost-effectiveness-- may actually come to pass through the force majeure of future demographic and financial realities. To explain the ICR rating, four aspects of sustainability were considered: sectoral, technical, financial, and institutional

20 (a) Sectorally, most of the reforms undertaken during project preparation were overturned later. However, some measures (timid cost-sharing and access control) may be sustainable, mainly thanks to some changes in the institutional culture (i.e. cost-consciousness, recognition of the need for resource diversification, etc.) of the academic community. The project may have contributed to this shift. In the long run, the increasing difficulty of financing larger cohorts of students while maintaining minimum academic standards is likely to make it easier to pass unavoidable reforms. Finally, the suspension of the credit appears to have triggered a constructive (albeit belated) reaction from the MoE which prepared a well-organized set of documentation and measures, and adopted a more systemic view of the sector. (b) Technically, there is no aspect of the project that the Government is not able to pursue. Training has been provided for all activities supported by the project, and there is no reason to believe that technical assistance will cease to be available in case it is still needed in specialized areas such as computerization, information systems, model designing or evaluation techniques. (c) Financially, the capacity of the Government to continue the operations initiated by the project depends, to a large extent, on the will to address the issue of sector financing as a whole. At present, the financial sustainability of the most successful project component -i.e. the library- is not ensured if based solely on the national budget. There is a real risk that the collections may not be renewed. Given the high visibility of the library, it is hoped that authorities will secure the necessary (domestic or foreign) resources to prevent this risk from materializing. The same risk applies to the maintenance of the equipment, at an even higher degree, because equipment is not as visible. More broadly, the financial viability of the sub-sector is less than guaranteed, and more radical changes will be needed to mitigate those risks. (d) Institutionally, as there is little progress directly due to the project to report, there is also little to expect in terms of durability. Some aspects may nevertheless carry on beyond project life, including (i) mechanisms to link faculty study tours and research, (ii) computerization of student service information, and (iii) better handling of procurement procedures. 6.2 Transition arrangement to regular operations: With the twofold evolution away from stand-alone investment projects and from adjustment operations, and the trend towards a programmatic approach, it is likely that higher education in the future will be part of more holistic operations. Steps in that direction were already taken at an early stage, with the PAES implementation structures streamlined with those of the ministry. Transition to regular operations has three aspects: (a) Strategically: The PAES was one of the last stand-alone (investment) operations in the education sector in Senegal. The subsequent operation is an ongoing ten-year, sector-wide program (Programme Décennal de l'éducation et de la formation - PDEF), supported by IDA and other donors. The transition from the PAES to this operation was formalized as early as December 2000, and has been relatively smooth, with the PDEF picking up a number of both policy measures and specific activities initially planned under the PAES. An appropriate follow-up to the PAES would be to regulate the flourishing private sector of tertiary education and to promote quality of its services, in order to attenuate the pressure on public universities. (b) Financially: There is little doubt that tertiary education in Senegal will require more