Note on citation. Examples. judgment on the merits delivered by a Chamber Campbell v. Ireland, no /98, 24, ECHR 1999-IT

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3 From I November 1998, the Reports ef judgments and Decisions of the European Court of Human Rights contain a selection of judgments delivered and decisions adopted after the entry into force of Protocol No. 11 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. AH judgments and decisions of the Court (with the exception of decisions taken by committees of three judges pursuant to Article 28 of the Convention), including those not published in this series, are available in the Court's case-law database (H UDOC) which is accessible via the Court's website ( Note on citation The form of citation for judgments and decisions published in this series from I November 1998 follows the pattern: name of case (in italics), application number, paragraph number (for judgments), abbreviation of the European Court of Huma n Rights (ECHR), year and number of volume. In the absence of any indication to the contrary the cited text is a judgment on the merits delivered by a Chamber of the Court. Any variation from that is added in brackets after the name of the case: "(dee.)" for a decision on admissibility, "(preliminary objections)" for a judgment concerning only preliminary objections, "Uust satisfaction)" for a judgment concerning only just satisfaction, "(revision)" for a judgment concerning revision, "(interpretation)" for a judgmenl concerning interpretation, "(striking out)" for a judgment striking the case out, or "(friendly settlement)" for a judgment concerning a friendly settlement. "[GC)" is added if the judgment or decision has been given by the G rand Chamber of the Court. Examples judgment on the merits delivered by a Chamber Campbell v. Ireland, no /98, 24, ECHR 1999-IT Judgment on the merits delivered by the Grand Chamber Campbell v. Ireland [GC], no /98, 24, ECHR Decision on admissibility delivered by a Chamber Campbell v. Ireland (dee.), no /98, ECHR 1999-II Decision on admissibility delivered by the Grand Chamber Campbell v. Ireland (dee.) [GC], no /98, ECHR 1999-II Judgment on preliminary objections delivered by a Chamber Campbell v. Ireland (preliminary obj ections), no /98, 15, ECHR 1999-II Judgment on just satisfaction delivered by a Chamber Campbell v. Ireland Uust satisfaction), no /98, 15, ECHR 1999-II Judgment on revision delivered by a C hamber Campbell v. Ireland (revision), no /98, 15, ECHR 1999-II Judgment on interpretation delivered by a C hamber Campbell v. Ireland (interpretation), no /98, 15, ECHR Judgment striking the case out delivered by a Chamber Campbell v. Ireland (striking out), no /98, 15, ECHR Judgment on a friendly settlement delivered by a Chamber Campbell v. Ireland (friendly settlement), no /98, 15, ECHR 1999-II

4 Depuis le I er novembre 1998, le Recueil des arrets et decisions de la Cour europeenne des Droits de!'homme renferme une selection des arrets rend us et des decisions adoptees apres l'entree en vigueur du Protocole n 11 a la Convention de sauvegarde des Droits de!'homme et des Libertes fondamentales. Tous les arrets et decisions de la Cour (a!'exception des decisions prises par des comites de trois juges en application de!'article 28 de la Convention), y compris ceux et celles non publies clans la presente serie, se trouvent clans la base de donnees sur la jurisprudence de la Cour (HUDOC), accessible sur le site Internet de la Cour ( Note concernant la citation des arrets et decisions Les arrets et decisions publies clans la presente serie a compter du 1 ' novembre 1998 sont cites de la maniere suivante: nom de l'affaire (en italique), numero de la requete, numero du paragraphe (pour les arrets), sigle de la Cour europeenne des Droits de!'homme (CEDH), annee et numero du recueil. Sauf mention particuliere, le texte cite est celui d'un arret sur le fond rendu par une chambre de la Cour. L'on ajoute apres le nom de l'affaire «(dee.)» pour une decision sur la recevabilite, «(exceptions preliminaires)» pour un arret ne portant que sur des exceptions preliminaires, (((satisfaction equitable)» pour un arret ne portant que sur la satisfaction equitable, (((revision) )) pour un arrt:t de revision, (((interpretation)» pour un arret d'interpretation, (((radiation))) pour un arret rayant l'affaire du role, (( (reglement amiable)» pour un arret sur un reglement amiable, et «[GC] )) si l'arret OU la decision ont ete rend us par la Grande Chambre de la Cour. Exemples Arret rendu par une chambre sur le fond Dupont c. France, n 45678/98, 24, CEDH Arret rendu par la Grande Chambre sur le fond Dupont c. France [GC], n 45678/98, 24, CEDH 1999-II Decision rendue par une chambre sur la recevabilite Dupont c. France (dee.), n 45678/98, CEDH Decision rendue par la Grande Chambre sur la recevabilite Dupont c. France (dfr.) [GC], n 45678/98, CEDH 1999-II Arret rendu par une chambre sur des exceptions preliminaires Dupont c. France (exceptions preliminaires), n 45678/98, 15, CEDH Arret rendu par une chambre sur la satisfaction equitable Dupont c. France (satisfaction equitable), n 45678/98, 15, CEDH 1999-II Arret de revision rendu par une chambre Dupont c. France (revision), n 45678/98, 15, CEDH Arret d'interpretation rendu par une chambre Dupont c. France (interpretation), n 45678/98, 15, CEDH Arret rendu par une chambre rayant l'affaire du role Dupont c. France (radiation), n 45678/98, 15, CEDH 1999-II Arret rendu par une chambre sur un reglement amiable Dupont c. France (reglement amiable), n 45678/98, 15, CEDH

5 Contents/Table des matieres Subject matter/objet des ajfaires... Page VII Christine Goodwin v. the United Kingdom [GC], no /95, judgment of 11 July Christine Goodwin c. Royaume-Uni [GC], n 28957/95, arret du 11 juillet Kalashnikov v. Russia, no / 99,judgment of 15July Kalachnikov c. Russie, n 47095/99, arret du 15 juillet Selim v. Cyprus (friendly settlement), no /99, judgment of 16July Selim c. Chypre (reglement amiable), n 47293/99, arret du 16juillet P., C. and S. v. the United Kingdom, no /00, judgment of 16July P., C. et S. c. Royaume-Uni, n 56547/00, arret du 16juillet Federation ef Offshore Workers' Trade Unions and Others v. Norway (dee.), no /97, 27 June Federation des.ryndicats de travailleurs qffihore et autres c. Norvege (dee.), n 38190/97, 27 juin Butler v. the United Kingdom (dee.), no /98, 27 June Butler c. Royaume- Uni (dee.), n 41661/98, 27 juin Gay duk et autres c. Ukraine (dee.), n /99, 46099/99, /99, /99, /99, 48018/99, 48043/99, 48071/99, 48580/99, 48624/99, 49426/99, 50354/99, 51934/99, /99, 53423/ 99, 53424/99, 54120/00, 54124/00, 54136/00, 55542/00 et 56019/00, 2 juillet Gay duk and Others v. Ukraine (dee.), nos /99, 46099/99, /99, /99, /99, 48018/99, 48043/99, 48071/99, 48580/99, 48624/99, 49426/99, 50354/99, 51934/99, 51938/99, 53423/99, 53424/99, 54120/00, 54124/00, 54136/00, 55542/00 and 56019/00, 2 July

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7 Subject matter/ Objet des affaires Article 3 Prison conditions Conditions de detention Kalashnikov v. Russia, p. 93 Kalachnikov c. Russie, p. 135 Article 6 Article 6 1 Lack of legal representation in proceedings concerning child care P., C. and S. v. the United Kingdom, p. 197 Defaut de representation juridique lors d 'une procedure mettant en jeu Jes interets d'un enfant P., C. et S. c. Royaume-Uni, p. 247 Article 6 2 Forfeiture of money believed to be intended for use in drug trafficking Butler v. the United Kingdom (dee.), p. 349 Confiscation d'argent dont on prcsumait qu'il ctait destine au trafic de stupefiants Butler c. Royaume-Uni (dee.), p. 369 Article 8 Absence of legal recognition of change of sex Christine Goodwin v. the United Kingdom [GC], p. I Non-reconnaissance juridique d 'une conversion sexuelle Christine Goodwin c. Royaume-Uni [GC], p. 45 T aking of child into care at birth and subsequent freeing for adoption P., C. and S. v. the United Kingdom, p. 197 I Prise en charge d'un enfant a la naissance et declaration d'adoptabilite ulterieure P., C. et S. c. Royaume-Uni, p. 247 Article 11 Termination of strike and imposition of compulsory arbitration by government Federation of Offshore Workers' Trade Unions and Others v. Norway (dee.), p. 301 Interdiction d 'une greve et recours a )'arbitrage impose par le gouvernement Federation des syndicats de travailleurs effshore et autres c. Norvege (dee.), p. 325

8 VIII SUBJECT MATTER/OBJET DES AFFAIRES Article 12 Impossibility for post-operative transsexual to marry person of opposite sex Christine Goodwin v. the United Kingdom [GC], p. 1 lmpossibilite pour une transsexuelle ayant subi une operation de conversion sexuelle de se marier avec une personne du sexe oppose Christine Goodwin c. Royaume-Uni [GC], p. 45 Absence of possibility for Turkish Cypriot of Muslim faith to contract civil marriage (friendly settlement) Selim u. Cyprus, p. 179 lmpossibilite pour un Chypriote turc de confession musulmane de contracter un mariage civil (reglement amiable) Selim c. Chypre, p. 187 Article 1 of Protocol No. 1/ Article 1 du Protocole n 1 Forfeiture of money believed to be intended for use in drug trafficking Butler u. the United Kingdom (dee.), p. 349 Confiscation d'argent dont on presumait qu'il etait destine au tralic de stupcliants Butler c. Royaume-Uni (dee.), p. 369 Inability to withdraw amounts indexed to savings deposits Gayduk and Others u. Ukraine (dee.), p. 405 Impossibilite d'obtenir les montants indexes de dep0ts d'epargne Gay duk et autres c. Ukraine (dee.), p. 389

9 CHRISTINE GOODWIN v. THE UNITED KINGDOM (Application no /95) GRAND CHAMBER J UDGMENT OF I I JULY 2002

10 CHRJSTINE GOODWIN v. THE UNITED KINGDOM JUDGMENT 3 SUMMARY' Absence of legal recognition of change of sex Impossibility for post-operative transsexual to marry person of opposite sex Article 8 Private life-absence ef legal recognition ef change ef sex - Positive obligations - Post-operative transsexuals - Reassessment ef issue in light ef"present-day conditions" - Failure to recognise legal implications ef lawful change ef sex - International trend in favour ef granting legal recognition ef change ef sex - Implications for existing system ef registration ef births - Right ef transsexuals to personal development and physical and moral securiry - Absence of detriment to public interest - Dury of sociery to acceptable certain inconvenience - Margin of appreciation Article 12 Right to marry - Impossibiliry for post-operative transsexual to marry person ef opposite sex - Men and women - Inadequacy of purely biological criteria in determining sex - Social change in relation to institution of marriage - Medical and scientific developments in the field ef transsexualiry - Essence of the right to marry * * * The applicant, who was registered at birth as male, lived as a woman from 1985 and in 1990 underwent gender-reassignment surgery, provided and paid for by the National Health Service. She complained of the lack of legal recognition of her change of sex. In particular, she alleged that her employer had been able to trace her identity because the Department of Social Security had refused to give her a new National Insurance number, that the department's records still showed her sex as male and that her file was marked "sensitive", causing her practical difficulties. She further complained that she had not become eligible for a State pension at the age of 60, the age of entitlement for women. Finally, she claimed that she had had to forgo certain advantages because she had not wished to present her birth certificate, which records sex at the time of registration. Held (I) Article 8: The Court had previously held that the refusal of the respondent Government to alter the register of births or to issue modified birth certificates could not be considered an interference with the right to respect for private life and that there was no positive obligation to alter the existing system or to permit annotations to the register of births. However, the Court had signalled its consciousness of the serious problems facing transsexuals and stressed the importance of keeping the need for appropriate legal measures under review and I. This summary by the Registry does not bind the Court.

11 4 CHRISTI NE GOODWIN v. THE UNITED KINGDOM JU DGMENT therefore decided to assess what was the appropriate interpretation and application of the Convention "in the light of present-day conditions". In the present case, despite having undergone gender-reassignment surgery, the applicant remained, for legal purposes, a male, with consequent effects on her life where sex was of legal relevance. The stress and alienation arising from a discordance between the position in society assumed by a post-operative transsexual and the status imposed by law could not be regarded as a minor inconvenience arising from a formality. The applicant's gender reassignment was carried out by the National H ealth Service and it appeared illogical to ref use to recognise the legal implications of the result. As to countervailing arguments of a public interest nature, the Court was not persuaded that the state of medical science or scientific knowledge provided any determining argument as regards the legal recognition of transsexuals. It also attached less importance to the lack of evidence of a common European approach to the matter than to the clear and uncontested evidence of a continuing international trend in favour not only of increased social acceptance of transsexuals but of legal recognition of the new sexual identity of post-operative transsexuals. As to the historical nature of the birth-registration system, exceptions were already mad e in the cases of legitimation and adoption and making a further exception in the case of transsexuals would not pose a threat to the whole system or create any real prospect of prejudice to third parties. Moreover, the Government had made proposals for reform which would allow ongoing amendment to civil status data. While the level of daily interference suffered by the applicant was not as great as in other cases, the very essence of the Convention is respect for human dignity and freedom and in the twenty-first century the right of transsexuals to personal development and to physical and moral security in the full sense enjoyed by others in society could not be regarded as a matter of controversy requiring the lapse of time to cast clearer light on the issues involved. In short, the unsatisfactory situation in which post-operative transsexuals lived in an intermediate zone was no longer sustainable. The difficulties posed by any major change in the system were not insuperable if confined to post-operative transsexuals. No concrete or substantial hardship or detriment to the public interest had been d emonstrated as likely to flow from any change to the status of transsexuals and, as regards other possible consequences, society could reasonably be expected to tolerate a certain inconvenience to enable individuals to live in dignity and worth in accordance with the sexual identity chosen by them. The Government could no longer claim that the matter fell within the margin of appreciation and the fair balance inherent in the Convention tilted decisively in favour of the applicant. Conclusion: violation (unanimously). (2) Article 12: While the first sentence of this provision refers in express terms to the right of a man and woman to marry, the Court was not persuaded that it could still be assumed that t_hose terms had to refer to a determination of gender by purely biological criteria. There had been major social changes in the institution of marriage since the adoption of the Convention, as well as dramatic changes brought about by developments in medicine and science in the field of transsexuality. The Court had found under Article 8 that a test of congruent biological factors could no longer be decisive in denying legal recognition to a

12 CHRISTINE GOODWI v. THE U ITED Kl GDOM JUDGMENT 5 change of gender. However, the right under Article 8 did not subsume all the issues under Article 12, where conditions imposed by national laws are accorded a specific mention, and the Court therefore considered whether in the present case the allocation of sex in national law to that registered at birth was a limitation impairing the very essence of the right to marry. In that regard, it was artificial to assert that post-operative transsexuals had not been deprived of the right to marry because they remained able to marry a person of their former opposite sex. The applicant lived as a woman and would only wish to marry a man but had no possibility of doing so and could therefore claim that the very essence of her right to marry had been infringed. While it was for the Contracting State to determine the conditions in which it could be esta blished that gender reassignment had been properly effected or in which past marriages ceased to be valid and the formalities applicable to fu ture marriages, there was no justification for barring the transsexual from enjoying the right to marry under any circumstances. Conclusion: violation (unanimously). (3) Article 14: The issues had been examined under Article 8 and no separate issue arose under Article 14. Conclusion: no separate issue (unanimously). (4) Article 3: In so far as no remedy existed in domestic law prior to the Human Rights Act 1998 taking effect, Article 13 cannot be interpreted as requiring a remedy against the state of domestic law. Following that date, it would have been possible for the applicant to raise her complaints before the domestic courts. Conclusion: no viola tion (unanimously). Article 41 : T he Court considered that the finding of a violation in itself canst i tu ted sufficient just satisfaction in respect of any non-pecuniary damage. It made an award in respect of costs and expenses. Case-law cited by the Court Tyrer v. the United Kingdom, judgment of 25 April 1978, Series A no. 26 Dudgeon v. the United Kingdom, judgment of 22 October 198 1, Series A no. 45 James and Others v. the United Kingdom,judgment of 2 1 February 1986, Series A no. 98 Rees v. the United Kingdom, judgment of 17 October 1986, Series A no. 106 F. v. Switzerland,judgment of 18 December 1987, Series A no. 128 Cossey v. the United Kingdom, judgment of 27 September 1990, Series A no. 184 B. v. France, judgment of 25 March 1992, Series A no. 232-C Barbera, Messeguiandjabardo v. Spain (Article 50),judgment of 13June 1994, Series A no. 285-C A/wry v. Turkey, judgment of 18 December 1996, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1996-VI X, Y and Z v. the United Kingdom, judgment of 22 April 1997, Reports Sheffield and Horsham v. the United Kingdom,judgment of 30July 1998, Reports 1998-V (;akzcz u. Turkey [GC], no /94, ECHR 1999-IV Chapman v. the United Kingdom [CC], no /95, ECHR 200 l-i Mikulic v. Croatia, no / 99, ECHR 2002-I Pretty v. the United Kingdom, no. 2346/02, ECHR 2002-III Stojford v. the United Kingdom [CC], no / 99, ECHR 2002-IV

13 CHRISTINE GOODWIN v. THE UNITED Kl GDOM JUDGMENT 7 In the case of Christine Goodwin v. the United Kingdom, The European Court of Human Rights, sitting as a Grand Chamber composed of the following judges: Mr L. WILDHABER, President, Mr J.-P. COSTA, Sir Nicolas BRATZA, Mrs E. PALM, Mr L. CAFLISCH, Mr R. T ORME, Mrs F. T ULKENS, Mr K.jUNGWIERT, Mr M. FISCHBACH, Mr V. BuTKEVYCH, Mrs N. VAJIC, Mr J. HEDIGAN, Mrs H.S. GREVE, Mr A.B. BAKA, Mr K. TRAJA, Mr M. UGR.EKHELIDZE, Mrs A. MuLARONI, and a lso of Mr P.J. MAHONEY, Registrar, Having deliberated in priva te on 20 March and 3 July 2002, Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on the lastmentioned date: PROCEDURE I. The case originated in an application (no /95) against the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland lodged with the European Commission of Human Rights ("the Commission") under former Article 25 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms ("the Convention") by a United Kingdom nationa l, Ms Christine Goodwin ("the a pplicant"), on 5June The applicant, who had been granted legal a id, was represented by Bindman & Partners, solicitors practising in London. The United Kingdom Government ("the Government") were represented by their Agent. 3. The applicant alleged violations of Articles 8, 12, 13 and 14 of the Convention in respect of the legal status of transsexuals in the United Kingdom and particula rly their treatment in the sphere of employment, social security, pensions and marriage. 4. The application was declared admissible by the Commission on I December 1997 and transmitted to the Court on 1 November 1999 in accordance with Article 5 3, second sentence, of Protocol No. 11 to the

14 8 CHRISTINE GOODWIN v. THE U ITED KINGDOM JU DGMENT Convention, the Commission not having completed its examination of the case by that da te. 5. The application was allocated to the Third Section of the Court (Rule 52 l of the Rules of Court). 6. The applicant and the Government each fil ed observations on the merits (Rule 59 l). 7. On l l September 200 l, a Chamber of that Section, composed of Mr J.-P. Costa, Mr W. Fuhrmann, Mr P. Kuris, Mrs F. Tulkens, Mr K. J ungwiert, Sir Nicolas Bra tza and Mr K. Traja, judges, and Mrs S. Dolle, Section Registrar, relinquished jurisdiction in favour of the Grand Chamber, neither of the parties having objected to relinquishment (Article 30 of the Convention and Rule 72). 8. The composition of the Grand Chamber was determined according to the provisions of Article 27 2 a nd 3 of the Convention and Rule 24 of the Rules of Court. The President of the Court decided that in the interests of the proper administration of justice, the case should be assigned to the Grand Chamber that had been constituted to hear the case of I. v. the United Kingdom (no /94, l l July 2002) (Rules 24, 43 2 and 71). 9. The applicant and the Government each filed a memorial on the merits. In addition, third-party comments were received from Liberty, which had been given leave by the President to intervene in the written procedure (Article 36 2 of the Convention and Rule 61 3). IO. A hearing in this case and the case of I. v. the United Kingdom (cited above) took place in public in the Human Rights Building, Strasbourg, on 20 March 2002 (Rule 59 2). There appeared before the Court: (a) for the Government Mr D. WALTON, of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, London Mr RABINDER SINGH, Mr j. STRACHAN, Mr C. LLOYD, Ms A. POWICK, Ms S. EISA, (b) for the applicant Ms L. Cox QC, Mr T. EICKE, Ms J. SOHRAB, Agent, Counsel, Advisers; Counsel, Solicitor. The applicant was also present.

15 CHRlSTl E GOODWI ' v. THE UNITED KlNGDOM JUDGME T 9 The Court heard addresses by Ms Cox and Mr Rabinder Singh. 11. On 3 July 2002, Mrs M. Tsatsa-Nikolovska a nd Mr V. Zagrebelsky who were unable to take part in further consideration of the case, were replaced by Mrs A. Mularoni and Mr L. Caflisch. THE FACTS I. THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE 12. The applicant is a United Kingdom citizen born in 1937 and is a post-operative male-to-fema le transsexual. 13. The applicant had a tende ncy to dress as a woman from early childhood and underwent aversion therapy in In the mid-l 960s she was diagnosed as a transsexual. Although she married a woman and they had four children, her conviction was that her "brain sex" did not fit he r body. From that time until 1984 she dressed as a ma n for work but as a woman in her free time. In J anuary 1985 the applicant began treatment in earnest, attending appointments once every three months at the Gender Identity Clinic at the C haring Cross Hospital, which included regula r consultations with a psychiatrist as well as with a psychologist on occasion. She was prescribed hormone therapy, began attending grooming classes a nd voice training. Since this time, she has lived fully as a woman. In October 1986 she underwent surgery to shorten her vocal chords. In August 1987, she was accepted on the waiting list for gender reassignm ent surgery. In 1990 she underwent gender-reassignment surgery at a National Health Service hospita l. Her treatment and surgery was provided a nd paid for by the National Health Service. 14. The applicant divorced from her former wife on a date unspecified but continued to enjoy the love and support of her children. 15. The applicant claimed that between 1990 and 1992 she had been sexually harassed by colleagues a t work. She attempted to pursue a case of sexual harassment in the Industrial Tribunal but claimed tha t she was unsuccessful because she was considered in law to be a man. She did not challenge this decision by appealing to the Employment Appeal Tribunal. The applicant was subsequently dismissed from her employment for reasons connected with her health, but alleged that the real reason was that she was a transsexual. 16. In 1996 the applicant started work with a new employer and was required to provide her National Insurance ("NI") number. She was concerned that the new employer would be in a position to trace her details as, once in the possession of the number, it would have been possible to find out about her previous employers a nd obtain information from them. Although she requested the allocation of a new NI number

16 10 CHRISTINE GOODWIN v. THE UNITED Kl GDOM JUDGMENT from the Department of Social Security ("the DSS"), this was rejected and she eventually gave the new employer her NI number. The applicant claimed that the new employer had traced back her identity as she began experiencing problems at work. Colleagues stopped speaking to her a nd she was told that everyone was ta lking about her behind her back. 17. The DSS Contributions Agency informed the applicant that she would be ineligible for a State pension at the age of 60, the age of entitlement for women in the U nited Kingdom. In April 1997 the DSS informed the applicant that her pension contributions would have to be continued until the date on which she reached the age of 65, being the age of entitlement for men, namely April On 23 April 1997 she therefore entered into a n undertaking with the DSS to pay the NI contributions directly which would otherwise be deducted by her employer as for all male employees. In the light of this undertaking, on 2 May 1997, the DSS Contributions Agency issued the applicant with a Form CF384 Age Exemption C ertificate (see "Relevant domestic law and practice'' below). 18. The applicant's files at the DSS were marked "sensitive" to ensure that only an employee of a particular grade had access to her files. This meant in practice that the applicant had to make specia l appointments for even the most trivial matters and could not deal directly with the local office or deal with queries over the telephone. H er record continued to state her sex as male and despite the "special procedures" she has received letters from the DSS addressed to the male name which she was given at birth. 19. In a number of instances, the applicant sta ted that she has had to choose between revealing her birth certificate and foregoing certain advantages which were conditional upon her producing her birth certificate. In pa rticular, she has not followed through a loan conditional upon life insurance, a re-mortgage offer and an entitlement to winter fuel allowance from the DSS. Similarly, t he applicant rema ins obliged to pay the higher motor insurance premiums applicable to men. Nor did she feel able to report a theft of 200 pounds sterling to the police, for fear that the investigation would require her to reveal her identity. II. RELEVANT DOMESTIC LAW AND PRACTICE A. Names 20. Under English law, a person is entitled to adopt such first names or surname as he or she wishes. Such names are valid for the purposes of identification and may be used in passports, driving licences, medical a nd insurance cards, etc. The new names are also entered on the electoral roll.

17 CHRJSTINE GOODWIN v. THE UNITED KINGDOM JUDGMENT 11 B. Marriage and definition of gender in domestic law 21. Under English law, marriage is defined as the volunta ry union between a man and a woman. In Corbett v. Corbett ([1 97 1] Law Reports: Proba te 83), Mr Justice Ormrod ruled tha t sex for tha t purpose is to be determined by the application of chromosom al, gonadal and genital tests where these are congruent and without regard to any surgical intervention. This use of biological criteria to determine sex was a pproved by the Court of Appeal in R. v. Tan ([1983] Law Reports: Queen's Bench Division 1053) and given more general application, the court holding that a person born male had been correctly convicted under a statute penalising men who live on the earnings of prostitution, notwithstanding the fact that the accused had undergone gender reassignment therapy. 22. Under section 11 (b) of the Ma trimonial Causes Act 1973, any marriage where the pa rties are not respectively male and fem ale is void. The test applied as to the sex of the partners to a marriage is that laid down in Corbett v. Corbett, cited above. According to tha t same decision a marriage between a male-to-fem a le transsexual and a man might also be voided on the basis tha t the transsexual was incapable of consumma ting the marriage in the context of ordinary and complete sexual intercourse (obiter per Mr Justice Ormrod). This d ecision was reinforced by section 12 (a) of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973, according to which a m arriage that has not been consumma ted owing to the incapacity of either party to consum mat e is voidable. Section 13(1) of the Act provides that the court must not grant a decree of nullity if it is satisfied that the petitioner knew the marriage was voidable, but led the respondent to believe that she would not seek a decree of nullity, and that it would be unjust to grant the decree. C. Birth certificates 23. Registration of births is governed by the Births and Deaths Registration Act 1953 ("the 1953 Act"). Section 1 (I) of tha t Act requires tha t the birth of every child be registered by the Registra r of Births and Deaths for the area in which the child is born. An entry is regarded as a record of t he facts at the time of birth. A birt h certificate accordingly constitutes a document revealing not current identity but historical facts. 24. The sex of the child must be entered on the birth certificate. T he criteria for determining the sex of a child a t birth a re not defined in the Act. The practice of the registrar is to use exclusively the biological criteria (chromosomal, gonadal a nd genital) as laid down by Mr Justice Ormrod in Corbett v. Corbett, cited above.