Creating a North American Community

Transcription

1 Creating a North American Community Chairmen s Statement Independent Task Force on the Future of North America Sponsored by the Council on Foreign Relations in association with the Consejo Mexicano de Asuntos Internacionales and the Canadian Council of Chief Executives John P. Manley, Pedro Aspe, and William F. Weld Chairs Thomas P. d Aquino, Andrés Rozental, and Robert A. Pastor Vice Chairs

2 Founded in 1921, the Council on Foreign Relations is an independent, national membership organization and a nonpartisan center for scholars dedicated to producing and disseminating ideas so that individual and corporate members, as well as policymakers, journalists, students, and interested citizens in the United States and other countries, can better understand the world and the foreign policy choices facing the United States and other governments. The Council does this by convening meetings; conducting a wide-ranging Studies program; publishing Foreign Affairs, the preeminent journal covering international affairs and U.S. foreign policy; maintaining a diverse membership; sponsoring Independent Task Forces; and providing up-to-date information about the world and U.S. foreign policy on the Council s website, The Consejo Mexicano de Asuntos Internacionales (COMEXI) is the only multidisciplinary organization committed to fostering sophisticated, broadly inclusive political discourse and analysis on the nature of Mexico s participation in the international arena and the relative influence of Mexico s increasingly global orientation on domestic priorities. The Council is an independent, nonprofit, pluralistic forum, with no government or institutional ties, that is financed exclusively by membership dues and corporate support. The main objectives of COMEXI are to provide information and analysis of interest to our associates, as well as to create a solid institutional framework for the exchange of ideas concerning pressing world issues that affect our country. Founded in 1976, the Canadian Council of Chief Executives (CCCE) is Canada s premier business association, with an outstanding record of achievement in matching entrepreneurial initiative with sound public policy choices. Composed of the chief executives of 150 leading Canadian enterprises, the CCCE was the Canadian private sector leader in the development and promotion of the Canadian-U.S. Free Trade Agreement during the 1980s and of the subsequent trilateral North American Free Trade Agreement. THE COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS TAKES NO INSTITUTIONAL POSITION ON POLICY ISSUES AND HAS NO AFFILIATION WITH THE U.S. GOVERNMENT. ALL STATEMENTS OF FACT AND EXPRESSIONS OF OPINION CONTAINED IN ITS PUBLICATIONS ARE THE SOLE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE AUTHOR OR AUTHORS. The Council will sponsor an Independent Task Force when (1) an issue of current and critical importance to U.S. foreign policy arises, and (2) it seems that a group diverse in backgrounds and perspectives may, nonetheless, be able to reach a meaningful consensus on a policy through private and nonpartisan deliberations. Typically, a Task Force meets between two and five times over a brief period to ensure the relevance of its work. Upon reaching a conclusion, a Task Force issues a report, and the Council publishes its text and posts it on the Council website. Task Force reports reflect a strong and meaningful policy consensus, with Task Force members endorsing the general policy thrust and judgments reached by the group, though not necessarily every finding and recommendation. Task Force members who join the consensus may submit additional or dissenting views, which are included in the final report. A Chairmen s Statement is signed by Task Force chairs only and is usually preceded or followed by full Task Force reports. Upon reaching a conclusion, a Task Force may also ask individuals who were not members of the Task Force to associate themselves with the Task Force report to enhance its impact. All Task Force reports benchmark their findings against current administration policy in order to make explicit areas of agreement and disagreement. The Task Force is solely responsible for its report. The Council takes no institutional position on the findings or recommendations in the report. The Task Force on the Future of North America is sponsored by the Council on Foreign Relations in association with the Consejo Mexicano de Asuntos Internacionales and the Canadian Council of Chief Executives. For further information about the Council or this Task Force, please write to the Council on Foreign Relations, 58 East 68th Street, New York, NY 10021, or call the Director of Communications at Visit our website at Copyright 2005 by the Council on Foreign Relations, Inc. All rights reserved. Printed in the United States of America. This report may not be reproduced in whole or in part, in any form beyond the reproduction permitted by Sections 107 and 108 of the U.S. Copyright Law Act (17 U.S.C. Sections 107 and 108) and excerpts by reviewers for the public press, without express written permission from the Council on Foreign Relations. For information, write to the Publications Office, Council on Foreign Relations, 58 East 68th Street, New York, NY

3 CONTENTS Chairmen s Statement 1 Declaración de los Presidentes 13 Déclaration des Présidents 27

4 CHAIRMEN S STATEMENT Introduction When the leaders of Canada, Mexico, and the United States meet in Texas on March 23, they will be representing countries whose futures are shared as never before. U.S. trade with Mexico and Canada accounts for almost one-third of total U.S. trade. U.S. trade with its North American neighbors substantially exceeds its trade with the European Union, and with Japan and China combined. In the energy sector, Canada and Mexico are now the two largest exporters of oil to the United States. Canada alone supplies the United States with over 95 percent of its imported natural gas and 100 percent of its imported electricity. In 2005, the borders between Canada, Mexico, and the United States will be crossed almost 400 million times. North America has become more than a free trade zone or an expression of geography. We are three liberal democracies, committed to protecting individual rights, upholding the rule of law, ensuring equality of opportunity for our citizens, and achieving a reasonable balance between the market and the state. The ever-deepening integration of North America promises enormous benefits for its citizens. These benefits, however, are neither inevitable nor irreversible. The process of change must be properly managed. As government officials, we wrestled on a daily basis with the challenges that North America confronts. Now, as private citizens, we are able to reflect more systematically on these challenges and to articulate a long-term vision of how to meet them. To that end, we offer this Chairmen s Statement in anticipation of the trinational summit, which comes at a pivotal time in our relationship. This statement reflects the consensus of the three chairmen and three vice chairs of the Task Force. The Task Force s complete report, to be issued in the spring, will take stock of the results of the Texas summit and reflect the views of the full Task Force membership. This statement does not necessarily represent the views of other Task Force members. The Independent Task Force on the Future of North America is sponsored by the Council on Foreign Relations in association with the Consejo Mexicano de Asuntos Internacionales and the Canadian Council of Chief Executives. 1

5 Eleven years ago, the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) liberalized trade and investment in most sectors, provided crucial protections for intellectual property, created pioneering dispute-resolution mechanisms, and established new procedures for enforcing labor and environmental standards. Since then, NAFTA has accelerated commercial exchange in North America, helping to unlock the region s economic potential and demonstrating that nations with different levels of development can negotiate commercial arrangements. To build on the advances of the past decade and to craft an agenda for the future, we propose the creation by 2010 of a community to enhance security, prosperity, and opportunity for all North Americans. To that end, we propose a community based on the premise that each member benefits from its neighbor s success and is diminished by its problems. The boundaries of the community would be defined by a common external tariff and an outer security perimeter. Within this area, the movement of people and products would be legal, orderly, and safe. The overarching goal is to guarantee a free, safe, just, and prosperous North America. What We Face Today, our nations face three common challenges. 1. Shared security threats. Over the last decade, terrorist and criminal activity has underscored North America s vulnerability. All of the 9/11 terrorists succeeded in entering the United States directly from outside North America, but the arrest of a person in 1999 trying to cross the Canadian-U.S. border as part of a plot to bomb the Los Angeles airport shows that terrorists also will try to gain access to the United States through Canada and Mexico. Hundreds of thousands of people cross illegally into the United States each year and both Canada and Mexico also must deal with persistent flows of undocumented immigrants. Failure to secure the external borders of North America will inhibit the legitimate movement of people and goods within the continent, to our collective detriment. After the 9/11 attacks, delays at the Canadian-U.S. border prompted unplanned parts shortages in both countries, costing manufacturing facilities millions of dollars an hour. These downstream consequences mean that Canada and Mexico have an overriding commercial interest in 2

6 increasing North American security, apart from any other considerations. In addition, future terrorist assaults could target sites in any of the three countries, and even an attack aimed exclusively at an American city or installation could spill over to Mexico or Canada. The reality of North American interdependence is that all three countries must work together to ensure the security of the continent. Beyond terrorism, international criminal activity poses a continuing threat to public safety in the region. Perhaps most notable in this regard is drug- and gang-related violence along the Mexican-U.S. frontier. Because these threats cross borders, they cannot be addressed adequately by any one government alone. Failure to address security issues will ultimately undermine gains on other fronts. In the North American context, failure to collaborate effectively to address security issues will have a direct impact on commercial relationships, as well as on our freedoms and quality of life. 2. Shared challenges to enhance our competitiveness. Over the last decade nations around the world, from China to India to Latin America to the expanded membership of the European Union, have become increasingly integrated into the global market. NAFTA dramatically spurred the pace of economic integration within North America, but we need to address issues that today place burdensome restraints on our ability to compete. Unwieldy rules of origin, increasing congestion at ports of entry, and regulatory differences among the three countries raise our costs instead of reducing them. Trade in natural resources, foodstuffs, and other key areas including the crucial energy sector remains far from free. Finally, the NAFTA partners have been unable to resolve a number of important trade and investment disputes, which have created friction in our commercial relationships. 3. Shared interest in broad-based development. While trade and investment flows have increased dramatically among our three countries, the development gap between Mexico and its two northern neighbors has widened. This disparity undermines cooperation on areas of common interest and gives rise to regional problems. Low wages and lack of economic opportunity in parts of Mexico stimulate undocumented immigration and contribute to human suffering, which sometimes translates into criminality and violence. As a matter of 3

7 their own national interests, all three countries should do more to encourage broad-based economic development in Mexico. These challenges require urgent attention. Although North America remains the world s economic powerhouse, increasing global competition could undermine its long-run prosperity. What We Can Do Trinational collaboration is essential to ensure regional prosperity and security. Although there are some issues where bilateral cooperation has historically been much more intense such as U.S.-Canadian military-to-military cooperation there are many more issues for which a trinational approach would be beneficial. Shared concerns range from regional economic competitiveness to law enforcement, from energy security to regulatory policy, from dispute resolution to continental defense. North America, moreover, is quite different from other regions of the world and must find its own cooperative route forward. A new North American community will not be modeled on the European Union or the European Commission, nor will it aim at the creation of any sort of vast supranational bureaucracy. Our vision of North America is one of three sovereign states whose formal collaboration must reflect their mutual interdependence while respecting their differences. We focus our recommendations on the creation of a single economic space that expands the economic opportunities for all people in the region, and the establishment of a security zone that protects the region from external threats while facilitating the legitimate passage of goods, people, and capital. 4

8 We make six key recommendations: 1. Create the institutions necessary to sustain a North American community. We propose that the trinational summit become a regular event. Annual summit meetings among the three countries of North America will demonstrate the strategic importance of the North American community. We propose further the establishment of a North American Advisory Council to prepare and monitor action to implement the decisions made at these summits. 2. Immediately create a unified North American Border Action Plan. The threat of international terrorism originates, for the most part, outside of North America. Our external borders are a critical line of defense against this threat. Any weakness in controlling access to North America from abroad reduces the security of the continent as a whole and exacerbates the pressure to intensify controls over intracontinental movement and traffic, which increases the transaction costs associated with trade and travel within North America. The governments of Canada, Mexico, and the United States should articulate as their long-range goal a common security perimeter for North America. In particular, the three governments should strive toward a situation in which a terrorist trying to penetrate our borders will have an equally hard time doing so no matter which country he elects to enter first. Like free trade a decade ago, a common security perimeter for North America is an ambitious but achievable goal that will require specific policy, statutory, and procedural changes in all three nations, including: Harmonization of visa and asylum regulations, including convergence of the list of visa waiver countries; Harmonization of entry screening and tracking procedures for people, goods, and vessels (including integration of name-based and biometric watch lists); Harmonization of exit and export-tracking procedures; Full sharing of data about the exit and entry of foreign nationals; Joint inspection by the three countries of container traffic entering North American ports, building on the Container Security Initiative between the United States and Canada; and 5

9 A commitment to a common approach to international negotiations related to global movement of people, cargo, and vessels. Enhance law enforcement cooperation. The security cooperation of the three countries should also extend to cooperation on counterterrorism and law enforcement and could include the establishment of a trinational threat-intelligence center, the development of trinational ballistics and explosives registration, and joint training for law enforcement officials from the three countries, among other measures. Rapid progress in trilateral law enforcement cooperation will be possible only insofar as the respective governments protect the integrity of their public institutions and root out any systemic corruption that may exist. Expand defense cooperation. In addition to strengthening cooperation among counterterrorism and law enforcement agencies in all three countries, it is essential to build on the strong foundation of the continent s existing military agreements. The most important step is to expand the binational North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) to make it a multiservice Canadian-U.S. command with a mandate to protect the maritime as well as air approaches to North America. In addition, Canada and the United States should invite Mexico to consider more extensive information-sharing and collaborative planning involving military organizations to build mutual trust and perhaps pave the way for more cooperation in the future. 3. Adopt a common external tariff. We recommend that the three governments begin by harmonizing external tariffs on a sector-by-sector basis to the lowest prevailing rate consistent with multilateral obligations. They should begin with goods on which current tariffs are closest, then proceed to close larger gaps, with the goal over time of adopting a common external tariff, thus eliminating the need for complex and costly rules of origin. We recommend that the three countries enter into negotiations in an effort to find a joint approach to unfair trade practices and anti-competitive behavior, including dumping. We call for creating a permanent roster of panelists for the NAFTA ad hoc dispute-resolution panels to improve consistency, predictability, and efficiency. The three countries should accelerate and expand implementation of existing smart border action plans to facilitate intra North American travel and commerce. The three countries should develop a secure North American Border Pass with biometric 6

10 identifiers. This document would allow its bearers expedited passage through customs, immigration, and airport security throughout the region. Over the longer term, it should be possible to rethink fundamentally the systems for national control of intracontinental travel and trade. This will be particularly true if the three countries make genuine progress toward establishing a common security perimeter. North America is different from Europe, of course, but it is instructive that the members of the European Union have managed largely to eliminate physical border controls. The governments of Canada, Mexico, and the United States should commit themselves to the long-term goal of dramatically diminishing the need for the current intensity of the governments physical control of traffic, travel, and trade within North America. 4. Stimulate economic growth in Mexico. To realize the full benefits of economic integration, and to ensure that these benefits are distributed broadly, Mexico must increase and sustain a rate of growth commensurate with its development goals. Mexico must devise a set of policies that commands broad public support and decide on the steps it will take to attract investment and stimulate growth. In conjunction, the United States and Canada should support Mexico by establishing a North American Investment Fund to create infrastructure to link the poorer parts of the country to the markets in the north, and to support education and technical training for Mexican states and municipalities committed to transparency and new development. The fund should be seen as a productive investment by all three countries in the future competitiveness of North America s economic zone. 5. Develop a North American energy and natural-resource security strategy. A reliable supply of key natural resources is essential to the region s long-term security and prosperity, while respecting each country s individual policies and priorities. To that end, the three governments should develop a comprehensive joint plan to expand and protect energy infrastructure, fully develop continental reserves, conserve fossil fuels, and reduce emissions. Ultimately, regional collaboration on conservation and emissions could form the basis for a North American alternative to the Kyoto Protocol. 7

11 6. Deepen educational ties. Given its historical, cultural, political, and economic ties, North America should have the largest educational-exchange network in the world. We recommend the expansion of scholarship and exchange programs for students at both the secondary and university levels, the development of a network of Centers for North American Studies in all three countries, and cross-border training programs for elementary- and secondary-school teachers. 8

12 TASK FORCE CHAIRS JOHN P. MANLEY is senior counsel at McCarthy Tétrault LLP. He has held several senior portfolios in the Canadian government throughout his 15 years of public service including Industry, Foreign Affairs, and Finance as well as being Deputy Prime Minister. Following 9/11, he was named Chairman of the Public Security and Anti-terrorism Cabinet Committee and, in that capacity, negotiated the Smart Border Agreement with U.S. Secretary for Homeland Security Tom Ridge. PEDRO ASPE is CEO of Protego, a leading investment banking advisory firm in Mexico. Mr. Aspe was most recently the Secretary of the Treasury of Mexico ( ). He has been a professor of economics at ITAM and has held a number of positions with the Mexican government. WILLIAM F. WELD is a principal at Leeds Weld & Co., a private equity investment firm in New York. Previously Mr. Weld was elected to two terms as Governor of Massachusetts ( ), served as Assistant U.S. Attorney General in charge of the Criminal Division of the United States Department of Justice in Washington, DC ( ), and as the U.S. Attorney for Massachusetts during the Reagan administration ( ). THOMAS P. D AQUINO is Chief Executive of the Canadian Council of Chief Executives (CCCE), composed of 150 chief executives of major enterprises in Canada. A lawyer, entrepreneur, and business strategist, he has served as Special Assistant to the Prime Minister of Canada, and adjunct professor of law lecturing on the law of international trade. He is the Chairman of the CCCE s North American Security and Prosperity Initiative launched in ANDRÉS ROZENTAL is President of the Consejo Mexicano de Asuntos Internacionales. Mr. Rozental was a career diplomat for more than 30 years, having served his country as Ambassador to the United Kingdom ( ), Deputy Foreign Minister ( ), Ambassador to Sweden ( ), and Permanent Representative of Mexico to the United Nations in Geneva ( ). During 2001, he was Ambassador-at-large and Special Envoy for President Vicente Fox. 9

13 ROBERT A. PASTOR is the Director of the Center for North American Studies, Vice President of International Affairs and Professor at American University. From 1977 to 1981 he was Director of Latin American Affairs on the National Security Council. He has a Ph.D. in government from Harvard University and is the author or editor of 16 books, including Toward a North American Community: Lessons from the Old World for the New. CHAPPELL H. LAWSON, Project Director of this Task Force, is an Associate Professor of Political Science at MIT, where he holds the Class of 1954 Career Development Chair. Before joining the MIT faculty he served as Director for Inter-American Affairs on the National Security Council

14 Creación de una comunidad de América del Norte Declaración de los presidentes del Grupo de Trabajo independiente sobre el futuro de América de Norte Patrocinado por el Council on Foreign Relations en asociación con el Consejo Mexicano de Asuntos Internacionales y el Canadian Council of Chief Executives John P. Manley, Pedro Aspe y William F. Weld Presidentes Thomas P. d Aquino, Andrés Rozental y Robert A. Pastor Vicepresidentes 11

15 Fundado en 1921, el Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) es una organización independiente, de membresía nacional y un centro no partidista para académicos dedicados a producir y diseminar ideas de forma que los miembros individuales y corporativos, así como los trazadores de políticas, periodistas, estudiantes y ciudadanos interesados en Estados Unidos y otros países puedan identificar mejor el mundo y las opciones de política exterior que se plantean a Estados Unidos y otros gobiernos. El CFR realiza esta función convocando a reuniones, llevando a cabo un programa de estudios de largo alcance, publicando Foreign Affairs, la revista más importante en asuntos internacionales y en política exterior estadounidense, tutelando a un grupo diversificado de miembros, patrocinando equipos de trabajo independientes y ofreciendo información actualizada sobre el mundo y la política exterior estadounidense en el sitio web del CFR: El Consejo Mexicano de Asuntos Internacionales (COMEXI) es, desde su fundación en 2001 la única organización multidisciplinaria mexicana dedicada a promover el debate y análisis avanzados y ampliamente incluyentes sobre la naturaleza de la participación de México en la arena internacional y la influencia relativa de su orientación cada vez más global sobre las prioridades nacionales. El COMEXI es un foro independiente, no lucrativo y plural, sin nexos gubernamentales o institucionales, financiado exclusivamente con cuotas de sus miembros y el apoyo empresarial. Los principales objetivos del COMEXI son ofrecer información y análisis de interés a nuestros asociados, así como crear un sólido marco institucional para el intercambio de ideas referentes a temas mundiales acuciantes que afectan a nuestro país. Sus actividades, publicaciones y lista de asociados pueden consultarse en Fundado en 1976, el Canadian Council of Chief Executives (Consejo Canadiense de Ejecutivos en Jefe) (CCCE, por sus siglas en inglés) es la asociación empresarial más importante de Canadá, con un destacado historial de logros en acoplar la iniciativa de las empresas con elecciones sólidas de política pública. Integrado por consejeros de 150 empresas líderes canadienses, el CCCE fue líder del sector privado en el desarrollo y promoción del Acuerdo de Libre Comercio Estados Unidos-Canadá durante la década de 1980 y el subsiguiente acuerdo trilateral: Tratado de Libre Comercio de América del Norte. EL COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS NO ADOPTA NINGUNA POSTURA INSTITUCIONAL SOBRE TEMAS DE POLÍTICA NI TIENE AFILIACIÓN CON EL GOBIERNO ESTADOUNIDENSE. TODAS LAS DECLARACIONES DE HECHO Y EXPRESIONES DE OPINIÓN CONTENIDAS EN SUS PUBLICACIONES SON RESPONSABILIDAD ÚNICA DEL AUTOR O AUTORES. El consejo patrocinará a un comité de trabajo independiente cuando (1) surja un tema de importancia vital y vigente para la política exterior estadounidense, y (2) parezca que un grupo diverso en antecedentes y perspectivas pueda, sin embargo, llegar a un consenso significativo en cuestiones de política mediante deliberaciones privadas y no partidistas. Normalmente, un comité de trabajo se reúne entre dos y cinco veces en un periodo breve para garantizar la relevancia de su trabajo. Al llegar a una conclusión, el comité de trabajo emite un informe, y el CFR publica el texto y lo presenta en su sitio web. Los informes del comité de trabajo reflejan un consenso de política fuerte y significativo, y los miembros del comité avalan el sentido político general y los juicios alcanzados por el grupo, aunque no necesariamente todos los hallazgos y recomendaciones. Los miembros del comité que se adhirieron al consenso pueden presentar opiniones adicionales o disidentes, las cuales se incluyen en el informe final. La declaración de un consejeros es firmada sólo por los miembros del comité y, por lo general, van precedidas o seguidas por informes completos del comité. Al llegar a una conclusión, el comité también puede solicitar a individuos ajenos al comité que se solidaricen con el informe para reforzar su impacto. Todos los informes del comité comparan sus hallazgos con la política gubernamental vigente para volver explícitas zonas de acuerdo y desacuerdo. El comité de trabajo es el único responsable del informe. El CFR no adoptar ninguna postura institucional. Para mayor información sobre el CFR o comité, favor de escribir a: The Council on Foreign Relations, 58 East 68th Street, New York, NY 10021, o llamar al director de Comunicaciones al Visite nuestro sitio web en Copyright 2005 Council on Foreign Relations, Inc. Todos los derechos reservados Printed in the United States of America / Impreso en Estados Unidos. Este informe no puede ser reproducido en todo o en parte, en cualquier forma más allá de la reproducción permitida por las secciones 107 y 108 de la Ley del Copyright de Estados Unidos (17 U.S.C. Secciones 107 y 108) y pasajes citados por reseñistas en la prensa pública, sin permiso escrito expreso del Council on Foreign Relations. Si se requiere información, escribir a: Publications Office, Council on Foreign Relations, 58 East 68th Street, New York, NY

16 DECLARACIÓN DE LOS PRESIDENTES Introducción Cuando los líderes de Canadá, México y Estados Unidos se reúnan en Texas el 23 de marzo, estarán representando a tres países cuyos futuros son compartidos hoy como nunca antes. El comercio estadounidense con México y Canadá representa casi la tercera parte de su comercio total, y los intercambios de bienes y servicios con sus vecinos de América del Norte excede por mucho el que realiza con la Unión Europea, y con Japón y China juntos. En el sector energético, Canadá y México son hoy los dos principales exportadores de petróleo a Estados Unidos. Tan sólo Canadá provee a Estados Unidos alrededor del 95 por ciento de su gas natural importado y 100 por ciento de la electricidad que adquiere fuera de su territorio. En 2005, las fronteras entre México, Canadá y Estados Unidos se cruzarán 400 millones de veces. América del Norte se ha convertido en más que una zona de libre comercio o una expresión geográfica. Somos tres democracias liberales, comprometidas en proteger los derechos individuales, sostener el estado de derecho, garantizar la igualdad de oportunidades para nuestros ciudadanos y lograr un equilibrio razonable entre el mercado y el Estado. La integración de América del Norte se profundiza constantemente y promete grandes beneficios para sus ciudadanos, pero éstos no son inevitables ni irreversibles. El proceso de cambio debe manejarse adecuadamente. Cuando fuimos funcionarios de nuestros gobiernos, lidiamos cotidianamente con los desafíos que enfrenta América del Norte. Ahora, como ciudadanos privados, estamos en condiciones de reflexionar de manera más sistemática sobre estos desafíos y articular una visión de largo plazo sobre la mejor manera de enfrentarlos. Con esa finalidad, ofrecemos esta Declaración de los Presidentes en anticipación de la cumbre trinacional que se llevará a cabo en Texas el 23 de marzo, en una coyuntura decisiva de nuestra relación. La declaración refleja el consenso de los tres presidentes y de los tres vicepresidentes del grupo de trabajo (Task Force), el cual se integró de manera trinacional para contar con la experiencia y sabiduría de un conjunto de personalidades de nuestros tres países. El informe completo, que se dará a conocer esta primavera, tomará en cuenta los resultados de la cumbre de Texas y contará con el consenso general de los demás miembros, por lo que este texto no necesariamente representa los puntos de vista de todos los participantes en el ejercicio. El 13

17 Grupo de Trabajo Independiente sobre el Futuro de América del Norte está patrocinado por el Consejo Mexicano de Asuntos Internacionales, en asociación con el Council on Foreign Relations y el Canadian Council of Chief Executives. Hace once años el Tratado de Libre Comercio de América del Norte (TLCAN) liberalizó el comercio y la inversión en una mayoría de sectores de intercambios entre nuestras tres naciones, brindó protección decisiva a la propiedad intelectual, creó mecanismos sin precedente para la solución de controversias y estableció nuevos procedimientos para aplicar normas laborales y ambientales. A partir de entonces el TLCAN ha acelerado el intercambio comercial en América del Norte, ayudando a maximizar el potencial económico de la región y demostrando que naciones con diferentes niveles de desarrollo pueden negociar acuerdos comerciales mutuamente benéficos. Para construir sobre los progresos de la década pasada y trazar una agenda para el futuro, proponemos la creación, antes del 2010, de una nueva comunidad que aumente la seguridad, la prosperidad y las oportunidades para todos los ciudadanos de América del Norte. Con ese fin, proponemos una comunidad con una zona económica y arancel externo común, así como un perímetro externo de seguridad, que permita a nuestra región enfrentar mejor los retos y las oportunidades continentales. Dentro de esta zona, el movimiento de personas y productos sería legal, ordenado y seguro. El objetivo global es garantizar una América del Norte libre, segura, justa y próspera. Los retos que enfrentamos Hoy nuestras naciones enfrentan tres desafíos comunes. 1. Amenazas a la seguridad. En la década pasada, la actividad terrorista y criminal puso de relieve la vulnerabilidad de América del Norte. En el caso del 9/11, los terroristas lograron entrar a Estados Unidos directamente desde fuera de América del Norte, pero el arresto en 1999 de una persona que trataba de cruzar la frontera entre Canadá y Estados Unidos como parte de un complot de detonar una bomba en el aeropuerto de Los Ángeles muestra que estos criminales podrían también tener acceso a Estados Unidos vía Canadá o México. Cientos de miles de personas cruzan ilegalmente a los Estados Unidos cada año y tanto 14

18 México como Canadá también deben lidiar con flujos persistentes de migrantes indocumentados. Si no aseguramos las fronteras externas de América del Norte se inhibirá en nuestro detrimento colectivo el movimiento legítimo de personas y bienes entre nuestros tres países. Después del 11 de septiembre, las demoras en las fronteras ocasionaron una escasez imprevista de insumos para la industria manufacturera en los tres países, la cual costó millones de dólares por hora. Estas consecuencias demuestran que, aparte de cualquier otra consideración, las tres economías tienen un interés comercial sobresaliente en incrementar la seguridad de la región. Además, cualquier ataque terrorista en el futuro podría tener como objetivo blancos en cualquiera de los tres países. Asimismo aunque hubiera un ataque dirigido exclusivamente a una ciudad o instalación estadounidense, éste podría extender sus efectos hacia México o Canadá. La realidad de la interdependencia en América del Norte radica en que los tres países deben trabajar juntos para garantizar la seguridad del continente. Más allá del terrorismo, la actividad criminal internacional representa una amenaza contínua a la seguridad pública en la región. Tal vez lo más notorio en este aspecto sea la violencia relacionada con el narcotráfico y las bandas organizadas en la frontera entre México y Estados Unidos. Como estas amenazas cruzan fronteras, un solo gobierno no puede enfrentarlas aisladamente. A final de cuentas, el no atender los temas de seguridad mermará las ganancias que hemos logrado en otros frentes. En el contexto de América del Norte, la falta de una colaboración eficaz para atender asuntos de seguridad impacta directamente las relaciones comerciales, así como nuestras libertades y calidad de vida. 2. Retos compartidos para elevar nuestra competitividad. Durante la década pasada, naciones en todo el mundo desde China e India, hasta América Latina y la Unión Europea ampliada se han ido integrando cada vez más al mercado global. Si bien el TLCAN aceleró profundamente el ritmo de la integración económica en América del Norte, necesitamos atender temas que actualmente imponen severas limitaciones a nuestra capacidad de competir. Reglas de origen ineficaces, congestión cada vez mayor en puertos de entrada, y proliferación de diferencias reglamentarias y normativas entre los tres países incrementan costos en vez de reducirlos. El comercio en recursos naturales, alimentos y otras áreas claves 15

19 incluyendo el sector energético aún dista mucho de ser libre. Por último, los socios del TLCAN han sido incapaces de resolver ciertas una serie importante de disputas comerciales y de inversión, lo cual ha creado tensión en nuestras relaciones económicas. 3. Interés compartido en el desarrollo de la región. Si bien los flujos de comercio e inversión entre los tres países se han incrementado de manera importante, la brecha de desarrollo entre México y sus dos vecinos del norte se ha ensanchado. Estas disparidades socavan la cooperación en áreas de interés común y propician el surgimiento de problemas regionales. Los bajos salarios y la falta de oportunidades económicas en partes de México estimulan la migración indocumentada y contribuyen al sufrimiento humano que a veces se traduce en criminalidad y violencia. Como asunto de su propio interés nacional los tres países deben hacer más para promover el amplio desarrollo económico de México. Estos retos requieren atención urgente. Si bien América del Norte sigue siendo el motor económico del mundo, a largo plazo la creciente competencia global podría minar su prosperidad futura. Si bien Estados Unidos sigue siendo la superpotencia mundial, nuevas amenazas de terroristas y criminales ponen en jaque la seguridad pública en las tres naciones. Lo que podemos hacer La colaboración trinacional es esencial para garantizar la prosperidad y seguridad en la región. Si bien hay temas en los que la cooperación bilateral ha sido históricamente mucho más intensa por ejemplo en la colaboración militar entre Estados Unidos y Canadá existen muchos otras áreas en las que un enfoque trilateral sería benéfico. Los intereses comunes van desde la competitividad económica regional, hasta la aplicación de la ley; desde la seguridad energética, hasta políticas regulatorias; y desde la solución de controversias, hasta la defensa continental. Como América del Norte es muy diferente de otras regiones del mundo, debe encontrar su propia ruta de cooperación hacia el futuro. Una nueva comunidad de América del Norte no seguirá el modelo de la Unión europea, ni de la Comisión europea, ni tenderá a la creación de 16

20 grandes burocracias supranacionales. Una comunidad existe cuando cada parte sabe que se beneficia del éxito de su vecino. Nuestra visión para América del Norte es la de tres Estados soberanos cuya colaboración formal refleje su interdependencia mutua y el respeto a sus diferencias. Concentramos nuestras recomendaciones en crear un solo espacio económico que amplíe las oportunidades para todos los habitantes de la región, y establezca una zona de seguridad que la proteja de amenazas externas, a la vez que facilite el tránsito legítimo de bienes, personas y capital. Hacemos seis recomendaciones claves: 1. Crear las instituciones necesarias para sostener una comunidad de América del Norte. Proponemos que las cumbres entre las tres naciones de América del Norte se conviertan en anuales, con lo cual se demostrará la importancia estratégica de nuestra comunidad. Proponemos además establecer un Consejo Asesor de América del Norte que prepare las cumbres y asegure el seguimiento de sus decisiones a fin de ponerlas en práctica. 2. Crear de inmediato un Plan de Acción Único para las Fronteras de América del Norte. Si bien la amenaza del terrorismo internacional se origina hasta ahora fuera de América del Norte, nuestras fronteras externas constituyen una crítica línea de defensa contra toda amenaza. Cualquier debilidad en vigilar desde el extranjero el acceso a América del Norte reduce la seguridad del continente en su conjunto y exacerba las presiones para intensificar controles sobre el movimiento y el tráfico entre los tres países que la componen. Ello incrementa los costos de transacción asociados al comercio y dificulta el viajar dentro de América del Norte. Como objetivo de más largo plazo, los gobiernos de Canadá, México y Estados Unidos deben crear un perímetro externo de seguridad para América del Norte. En especial, los tres gobiernos deben poner su mejor esfuerzo en asegurar que un terrorista que intente ingresar en nuestra región enfrente las mismas dificultades en cualquiera de los tres países al que pretenda ingresar primero. Como sucedió hace más de una década con el libre comercio, un perímetro común de seguridad para América del Norte constituye un logro ambicioso pero 17