Document of The World Bank IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION AND RESULTS REPORT (TF ) FOOD PRICE CRISIS RAPID RESPONSE TRUST FUND ON A GRANT

Transcription

1 Public Disclosure Authorized Document of The World Bank Report No: ICR2577 Public Disclosure Authorized IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION AND RESULTS REPORT (TF ) FOOD PRICE CRISIS RAPID RESPONSE TRUST FUND ON A GRANT UNDER THE GLOBAL FOOD CRISIS RESPONSE PROGRAM IN THE AMOUNT OF US$ 5.0 MILLION Public Disclosure Authorized TO THE REPUBLIC OF GUINEA FOR AN EMERGENCY AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTIVITY SUPPORT PROJECT March 24, 2013 Public Disclosure Authorized Agricultural, Irrigation and Rural Development Unit (AFTA1) Sustainable Development Department Country Department AFCW1 Africa Region i

2 CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS (Exchange Rate Effective as February 15, 2013 Currency Unit = Guinée Nouveau Franc (GNF) US$ 1.00 = GNF 7,190 GUINEA GOVERNMENT FISCAL YEAR January 1 December 31 WEIGHTS AND MEASURES Metric System ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS ANPROCA Agence Nationale de la Promotion Rurale et du Conseil Agricole (National Agency of Agricultural Advisory Services) BSD Bureau de Stratégie et de Développement (National Office for Studies and Planning) CNOP-G Confédération Nationale des Organisations Paysannes de Guinée (National Confederation of Farmer Organizations of Guinea) DNA Direction Nationale de l Agriculture (National Directorate of Agriculture) DNGR Direction Nationale du Génie Rural (National Directorate of Rural Engineering) DNSV Direction Nationale des Services Vétérinaires (National Directorate of Veterinary Services) FAO Food and Agriculture Organization GFRP Global Food Crisis Response Program GNF Guinean franc ha Hectare HIPC Heavily Indebted Poor Countries IBRD International Bank for Reconstruction and Development ICR Implementation Completion Report IDA International Development Association IRAG Institut de Recherche Agronomique de Guinée (Institute for Agricultural Research of Guinea) kg Kilogram M Million M&E Monitoring and evaluation NPK Nitrogen, phosphorus, potassium (fertilizer) PACV Programme d Appui aux Communautés Villageoises (Village Communities Support Program) PACV-2 Programme d Appui aux Communautés Villageoises Phase 2 (Village Communities Support Project Phase 2) PDO Project Development Objective PNIASA Plan Nationale d Investissement Agricole et de Sécurité Alimentaire (National Agricultural Medium-Term Investment Plan) PRSP Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper PUAPA-1 Programme d Urgence d Appui à la Productivité Agricole (First Emergency Agricultural Productivity Support Project) ii

3 PUAPA-2 TPRSP TTL UN WAAPP Programme d Urgence d Appui à la Productivité Agricole (Second Emergency Agricultural Productivity Support Project) Transitional Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper Task Team Leader United Nations West Africa Agricultural Productivity Program Vice President: Makhtar Diop Country Director: Ousmane Diagana Sector Manager: Martien van Nieuwkoop Project Team Leader: Jane Hopkins ICR Team Leader Alexis Yao Haccandy ICR Primary Author: Erick Abiassi iii

4

5 REPUBLIC OF GUINEA EMERGENCY AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTIVITY SUPPORT PROJECT CONTENTS A. BASIC INFORMATION... V B. KEY DATES... V C. RATINGS SUMMARY... V D. SECTOR AND THEME CODES... VI E. BANK STAFF... VI F. RESULTS FRAMEWORK ANALYSIS... VI G. RATINGS OF PROJECT PERFORMANCE IN ISRS... VIII H. RESTRUCTURING... VIII I. DISBURSEMENT PROFILE... IX 1. PROJECT CONTEXT, DEVELOPMENT OBJECTIVES, AND DESIGN KEY FACTORS AFFECTING IMPLEMENTATION AND OUTCOMES ASSESSMENT OF OUTCOMES ASSESSMENT OF RISKS TO DEVELOPMENT OUTCOME ASSESSMENT OF BANK AND BORROWER PERFORMANCE LESSONS LEARNED COMMENTS ON ISSUES RAISED BY BORROWER/IMPLEMENTING AGENCIES/PARTNERS ANNEX 1. PROJECT COSTS AND FINANCING ANNEX 2. OUTPUTS BY COMPONENT ANNEX 3. ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL ANALYSIS ANNEX 4. BANK LENDING AND IMPLEMENTATION SUPPORT/SUPERVISION PROCESSES ANNEX 5. BENEFICIARY SURVEY RESULTS ANNEX 6. STAKEHOLDER WORKSHOP REPORT AND RESULTS ANNEX 7. BORROWER'S ICR ANNEX 8. COMMENTS OF COFINANCIERS AND OTHER PARTNERS/STAKEHOLDERS ANNEX 9. SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS APPENDIX 1: PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION STATUS AND RESULTS REPORT (ISR) RATINGS, FROM OCTOBER 2008 TO JUNE MAP iv

6

7 Data Sheet A. Basic Information Country: Guinea Project Name: Project ID: P L/C/TF Number(s): TF ICR Date: 03/07/2013 ICR Type: Core ICR Lending Instrument: Original Total Commitment: Revised Amount: Emergency Recovery Loan Grantee: Emergency Agricultural Productivity Support Project GOVERNMENT OF GUINEA US$ 5.0.M Disbursed Amount: US$ 3.85 M US$ 5.0 M Environmental Category: B-Partial Assessment Implementing Agencies: Ministry of Agriculture, National Federation of Producer Organizations, and PACV-2 (for fiduciary oversight) Cofinanciers and Other External Partners: B. Key Dates Process Date Process Original Date Revised/Actual Date(s) Concept Review: 08/15/2008 Effectiveness: 10/06/ /06/2008 Appraisal: 09/09/2008 Restructuring(s): 02/01/ Approval: 09/19/2008 Mid-term Review: - - C. Ratings Summary C.1 Performance Rating by ICR Outcomes: Risk to Development Outcome: Bank Performance: Grantee Performance: Closing: 06/30/ /30/2012 Moderately Satisfactory Moderate Moderately Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory C.2 Detailed Ratings of Bank and Borrower Performance (by ICR) Bank Rating Borrower Rating Quality at Entry: Satisfactory Government: Moderately Satisfactory Quality of Supervision: Overall Bank Performance: Moderately Satisfactory Implementing Agency/Agencies: Moderately Satisfactory Overall Borrower Performance: Moderately Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory v

8 C.3 Quality at Entry and Implementation Performance Indicators Implementation Performance Potential Problem Project at any time (Yes/No): Problem Project at any time (Yes/No): DO rating before Closing/Inactive status: Indicators No No Satisfactory QAG Assessments (if any) Quality at Entry (QEA): Quality of Supervision (QSA): Rating None None D. Sector and Theme Codes Original Actual Sector Code (as % of total Bank financing) Crops Theme Code (as % of total Bank financing) Global food crisis response E. Bank Staff Positions At ICR At Approval Vice President: Makhtar Diop Obiageli Katryn Ezekwesili Country Director: Ousmane Diagana Ishac Diwan Sector Manager: Martien van Nieuwkoop Karen McConnell Brooks Project Team Leader: Jane C. Hopkins Jane C. Hopkins ICR Team Leader: Alexis Yao Haccandy ICR Primary Author: Erick Abiassi F. Results Framework Analysis Project Development Objectives (from Project Appraisal Document) The project development objective is to increase smallholder rice productivity on 35,000 hectares. Revised Project Development Objectives (as approved by original approving authority) The project PDO was not revised. However, targets for the key outcome indicators were revised upward on February 11, vi

9 (a) PDO Indicators (Note: These refer to baselines and targets set at restructuring in February 2011) Indicator Baseline Value Original Target Values Formally Revised Target Values Actual Value Achieved at Completion Indicator 1: Percent increase in rice yields of targeted smallholders Value 0% 30% 50% 96% Date achieved 09/19/ /06/ /11/ /30/2012 Comments Achieved. Indicator 2: Number of direct project beneficiaries Value 0 70,000 90, ,000 Date achieved 09/18/ /06/ /11/ /30/2012 Comments Achieved. (b) Intermediate Outcome Indicators (Note: these refer to baselines and targets set at restructuring in August 2008) Indicator Baseline Value Original Target Values Formally Revised Target Values Actual Value Achieved at Completion Indicator 1: Quantity of base seed produced by research stations purchased, certified, and stocked Value 0 60 tons - 45 tons Date achieved 09/19/ /06/ /30/2012 Partially Achieved. During the 2009/10 and 2011/12 cropping seasons, about 45 tons of foundation seed were produced, against a target of 60 tons. The target was not achieved due to climatic conditions (floods) and not to any lack of capacity at Koba research station. It is worth mentioning, however, that during Comments the 2011/12 cropping season, the government allocated exceptional funding out of its own budget to support IRAG s foundation seed production activities, leading to the production of an additional 200 tons of basic seed. Of that quantity, about 30 tons went to seed producers under the project. Thus in the end the project had more than 60 tons of foundation seed for further multiplication. Indicator 2: Quantity of improved seed produced by seed producers purchased, certified, and stocked Value 0 2,300-2,600 Date achieved 09/19/ /06/ /30/2012 Comments Achieved. Indicator 3: Number of producers receiving seed multiplication training Value Date achieved 09/19/ /06/ /30/2012 Comments Achieved Indicator 4: Quantity of fertilizer procured Value 0 2,000 tons - 1,400 tons Date achieved 09/19/ /06/ /30/2012 vii

10 Partially Achieved. 1,400 tons of fertilizers were purchased against a target of 2,000 tons. Following the Banks s re-engagement, there were difficulties with the procurement of the remaining fertilizer and the government agreed to provide 1,000 tons of fertilizer for project activities which were to be refunded once the Comments procurement of the same quantity under the project was effective. Unfortunately, due to delays in completing the procurement process, the project could not acquire the 1,000 tons as initially planned, and in the end a total of 2,400 tons were available under the project. For this reason, the project exceeded the target in covering beneficiaries while procuring less fertilizer than originally envisaged. Number of producers receiving improved input packages and adequate Indicator 5: advisory services Value 0 70,000 90, ,000 Date achieved 09/19/ /06/ /11/ /30/2012 Achieved. The project significantly increased rice producers access to improved Comments seed. For example, the average distance to travel to get improved seed dropped from 16 kilometers to 2 kilometers. G. Ratings of Project Performance in ISRs No. Date ISR Archived DO IP Actual Disbursements (US$ millions) 1 06/05/2009 Moderately Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory /23/2009 Moderately Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory /29/2011 Moderately Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory /15/2011 Satisfactory Satisfactory /16/2012 Moderately Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 4.90 H. Restructuring A level 2 restructuring was done on February 11, viii

11 I. Disbursement Profile ix

12

13 1. Project Context, Development Objectives, and Design 1.1 Context at Appraisal 1. Guinea is a low-income, food-deficit country of 10.2 million, which ranked 160 out of 175 countries in the United Nations Development Programme s Human Development Index for Over the past 15 years, Guinea has been plagued by political instability. Starting in early 2000, the country has been strongly affected by military conflicts in neighboring countries, including Liberia and Sierra Leone. Since then Guinea s economy has experienced low growth and double-digit inflation. In January and February 2007, strikes and confrontations between security forces and demonstrators in urban areas were partly caused by high food and fuel prices. As a result of the 2008 global food crisis, consumer prices for food had risen rapidly in Guinea. The price of a kilogram of imported rice in Conakry increased 96 percent from June 2007 to June Similarly, the price of locally produced potatoes and palm oil increased during the same period by about 80 and 64 percent, respectively, while annual inflation, which had declined to 12.8 percent at the end of 2007 from 39.1 percent at the end of 2006, had rebounded to 24.6 percent at the end of June In light of these challenging developments, the Government of Guinea formulated a strategy for responding to the food price crisis. The strategy had two main pillars: (i) supporting access to food for the most vulnerable populations and (ii) supporting increases in agricultural production. The pillar to improve access to food included: a temporary reduction in rice customs duties from to 2.75 percent; the distribution of take-home food rations for children for families of five or more members; emergency school feeding and nutrition support; and building an emergency food reserve of 25,000 metric tons. The pillar to increasing agricultural production included emergency support in the 2008 planting season to supply fertilizer, improved seed, veterinary inputs; repair and maintain agricultural assets; construct storage facilities; and build capacity in agricultural services. The second pillar also included support over the medium to longer term to intensify rice production and ensure a more stable national food supply through investments in irrigation infrastructure and improved inputs, water management, technology transfer, technical assistance to producers, and diversification of crop production. 3. Food insecurity is chronic in Guinea. Despite its strong agricultural potential, the country imports approximately one-third of its rice needs. About 6 percent of households are severely food insecure, 1 and 35 percent of the population consistently has problems meeting minimum daily caloric requirements. The concern was that higher prices could reduce the quantity and quality of food consumption and induce higher rates of acute malnutrition, especially during the lean season prior to the harvest. The Bank proposed an emergency program (the Guinea Emergency Agricultural Productivity Support Program) 1 World Food Programme, Impact of High Prices on Food Security and Nutrition, May

14 that focused on measures to address both the short-term as well as the medium- to longterm implications of the global food crisis for Guinea. Guinea s International Development Association (IDA) program was limited and fully committed, so the proposed interventions were financed out of the newly created Food Crisis Response Trust Fund. The trust fund supplied US$ 5.0 million as a component of a US$ 10.0 million support to the Bank s Guinea Emergency Food Crisis Response Program, which consisted of a Food Crisis Response Development Policy Grant (US$ 2.5 million) and an additional financing to the Third Urban Development Project (US$ 2.5 million). 1.2 Original Project Development Objectives (PDOs) and Key Indicators (as approved) 4. The development objective of the project was to increase smallholder rice productivity on 35,000 hectares of rainfed rice through the timely provision of improved inputs (seed, fertilizer, and pesticide) and technical advisory services In line with this objective, three sets of activities were envisioned: (i) support for the production of 2,000 tons of improved and certified seed during the 2008/09 cropping season by scaling up the farmer seed network and purchasing, treating, and stocking the seed for distribution during the 2009/10 cropping season; (ii) the purchase of 2,000 tons of fertilizer and 20,000 liters of herbicide and pesticide; (iii) the distribution of input packages (seed, fertilizer, herbicide/pesticide) though farmer organizations existing networks, and the provision of support for advisory services and technical assistance to smallholders. 6. The Project Appraisal Document specified the following key outcome indicators: (i) the rice yields of targeted smallholders increased by 30 percent; (ii) 70,000 of direct project beneficiaries (of which 40 percent are female). The intermediate outcome indicators were: (i) 2,000 tons of improved seed for rainfed rice systems (mangrove, lowlands, and inland plains) produced, certified, purchased, treated, and stocked; (ii) 2,000 tons of fertilizer and 20,000 liters of herbicide and pesticide procured; and (iii) 70,000 smallholders have received input packages and adequate technical advisory services. 1.3 Revised PDO (as approved by original approving authority) and Key Indicators, and reasons/justification 7. The project PDO was not revised. However, to account for a likely positive effect of an extended implementation period (more cropping seasons) and the availability of additional improved seed recovered from producers, the key outcome indicators were revised upward on February 11, 2011 while processing the extension of the project 2 Note that the formulation of the PDO as it stands in the financing agreement differs from the one found in the PAD, in which the development objective of the project was to produce 2,000 tons of certified seed through a smallholder seed multiplication network and provide input packages and technical assistance to 80,000 smallholders to increase their productivity on 40,000 hectares of rainfed rice. 2

15 closing date. 3 The project was initially planned to be implemented only for the 2008/09 cropping season. Disbursements were frozen, however, when the World Bank policy regarding de facto governments (OP 7.30) went into effect in December 2008, following the military coup. When the OP 7.30 was lifted on January 19, 2011, the project had disbursed only US$ 2.0 million out of the original US$ 5.0 million Grant. Extension of the closing date to June 30, 2012 was necessary to complete project activities and achieve the PDO. 1.4 Main Beneficiaries 8. The project focused its interventions on Guinea s three major rice-producing areas: Lower Guinea (Boke, Boffa, Dubreka, Forecariah, and Kindia), Upper Guinea (Kourroussa, Faranah, Kankan, Kerouane, Mandiana, and Siguiri), and Forest Guinea (Beyla, Guedeckou, Kissidougou, Macenta, Lola, and Nzerekore). About 90,000 smallholders were expected to benefit from project interventions. The Agricultural Research Institute of Guinea (Institut de Recherche Agronomique de Guinée, IRAG), National Agency of Agricultural Advisory Services (Agence Nationale de Promotion Rurale et du Conseil Agricole, ANPROCA), government seed centers, as well as the ministry in charge of agriculture received operational support under the project. Finally, input suppliers, local traders, and transporters were expected to benefit indirectly from increased rice production and trade. 9. To ensure that the poorer farmers would benefit from the project, especially from inputs distributed by the National Confederation of Farmer Organizations of Guinea (Confédération Nationale des Organisations Paysannes de Guinée, CNOP-G), high priority was given to smallholders who had less than two hectares and were members of producer organizations. The rationale was to give each beneficiary access to a sufficient package of inputs while reaching the largest possible number of eligible producers. 1.5 Original Components (as approved) 10. As specified in the Project Appraisal Document, the project had three components: Component 1: Support for the production of 2,000 tons of improved and certified seed during the 2008/09 production season by scaling up the farmer seed multiplication network, including the purchase, treatment, and stocking of seed for distribution during the 2009/10 cropping season. Component 2: Procurement of 2,000 tons of fertilizer and 20,000 liters of pesticide. 3 The number of direct beneficiaries shifted from 70,000 to 90,000, and the increase in rice yields moved from 30 to 50 percent. This decision was quite challenging, as project funding remained unchanged at US$ 5 million. 3

16 Component 3: Distribution of input packages (seed, fertilizer, pesticide) through the existing farmer organization networks, support for advisory services, and establishment of a revolving fund in which funds recovered from input sales were deposited and used to capitalize future input purchases. 1.6 Other Significant Changes 11. The project s original closing date (March 31, 2010) was extended to June 30, 2012 to allow the government to complete project activities and attain the project s development objective. The project s implementation was delayed following the military coup in December 2008 (2.5 months after effectiveness), upon which the Bank triggered OP 7.30 on de facto governments. Disbursements were suspended for more than two years. 12. With the lifting of OP 7.30 on January 19, 2011, the government requested an extension of the closing date until June 30, A detailed work plan for the period of the extension and a revised procurement plan were prepared. The project was thus implemented during two cropping seasons (2009/10 and 2011/12) (note that the cropping season extends from one year to the next and that crops are harvested between October and January). 2. Key Factors Affecting Implementation and Outcomes 2.1 Project Preparation, Design, and Quality at Entry 13. The Emergency Agricultural Productivity Support Project was prepared by an experienced task team brought together by the Bank. The team also received strong management support. Emergency procedures under OP 8.0 were used. Preparation of the project was initiated on July 3, 2008; it was approved on September 18, 2008 and became effective on October 4, The project design took into account the specific context of Guinea, including households consumption patterns and farmers need for inputs supplied through a sustainable mechanism. Although diversifying the array of food staples is an important element of a longer-run food security strategy in Guinea, this project focused on rice productivity, given the importance of rice in household consumption and the share of rice in overall crop production patterns. Moreover, in the absence of a functioning private sector input distribution system and limited access to rural finance, and in the presence of weak and non-transparent public distribution channels, a decision was made to focus on organized smallholders (about 40 percent of smallholders are members of producer organizations) as the entry point for building a sustainable and transparent input distribution system. 14. The appraisal mission held extensive discussions with representatives of the government and representatives from the European Commission, France, and key United Nations (UN) agencies. A rapid food assessment had been completed by the World Food Programme on May 12-23, 2008, identifying priority sectors for response. The result was 4

17 a UN-family response from the World Food Programme, the United Nations Children s Fund, Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), World Health Organization, and the United Nations Population Fund. The Bank s strategy for emergency support was aligned with the government s strategic approach and the agreed joint UN response. The project was designed to specifically address the government s food security program. 15. Based on relevant lessons learned from similar interventions, some strategic choices were made. The first was that the project would have a strong focus on immediate investments in improved inputs and better cropping practices, as these investments offer a substantial payoff in the short run particularly for smallholders although investment in water management infrastructure is a necessity to increase rice productivity in Guinea in the medium to longer term. The second was that the project would not simply be a one-time emergency effort; it would aim to lay the foundation for a more sustainable input distribution system, and thus its implementation arrangements and design would rely on sustainable institutional structures. 16. As noted, the project targeted its interventions on Guinea s three major riceproducing areas: Lower Guinea, Upper Guinea, and Forest Guinea. To ensure that the greatest number of poorer farmers would benefit from the project, inputs were made available to smallholders with less than 2 hectares. The project worked through CNOP-G and its member federations and unions. CNOP-G was responsible for distributing the input packages. Inputs were sold to members on a cropping-season credit basis. CNOP- G was to manage revenues from the sales according to a procedural manual that was to be approved by the steering committee and satisfactory to the Bank. 17. To ensure that support reached the intended beneficiaries, the project was designed to rely on the Coordination Unit for the existing World Bank funded Village Communities Support Program (Programme d Appui aux Communautés Villageoises, PACV) for all aspects of fiduciary management. That unit had a strong track record in overall project and financial management for PACV. Overall coordination and technical responsibility for the project rested with the National Directorate of Agricultural Advisory Services, which had already managed a successful seed multiplication system financed previously by the World Bank and other donors. Implementation was carried out by technical services of the Ministry of Agriculture and the CNOP-G, which benefited from funding and technical assistance from other donors active in the sector (Agence Française de Développement and the European Union). This arrangement was probably quite an innovative aspect of the project in the Guinean context, especially in view of the fact that the government ultimately modeled its own subsidy program on this approach as part of the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) completion triggers. 18. The risks identified and mitigation measures proposed under the project were quite adequate. For example, to mitigate the risk that inputs would not be available on time because of low domestic stocks, the operation targeted the 2009/10 cropping season and the 2008/09 dry season to allow sufficient time for inputs to be produced and procured. To mitigate the risk that achievements would not be sustained after the project closed, for implementation the project was structured to rely on, and build the capacity 5

18 of, existing government structures and producer organizations. The risk that beneficiaries would not be targeted in a transparent manner was partially mitigated by fully involving CNOP-G and its members in implementation. 2.2 Implementation 19. The project became effective on October 4, 2008, but after the president s death on December 22, 2008, political chaos and a military coup ensued. These developments caused disbursements to be frozen on December 23, 2008, when the World Bank policy regarding de facto governments (OP 7.30) went into effect. Because the initial deposit (US$ 2.0 million) to the designated project account was already available on November 5, 2008, the project nonetheless could start operations in the 2009/10 season. In consultation with the Bank, and in line with the resources available in the designated account, project targets were reduced for the 2009/10 planting season (for example, for inputs to be procured and numbers of beneficiaries and hectares to be covered). As of December 31, 2010, 400 tons of fertilizer, 4,710 liters of pesticide, and 500 tons of improved seed were procured and distributed to 23,825 smallholder rice producers with 8,075 hectares. The cost recovery rate was 78 percent for the fertilizer and 91 percent for the improved seed. The research station at Koba was unable to produce seed during the 2008/09 cropping season as initially planned because flooding delayed crop development. While OP 7.30 was in effect, the Bank conducted no formal supervision missions, but audio-conferences were regularly held with the project team to address implementation issues informally. 20. Once OP 7.30 was lifted, on January 19, 2011, the Government of Guinea requested that the project s closing date be extended to June 30, The request was evaluated and processed during the January 2011 Sustainable Development reengagement mission and became effective on February 11, It should also be noted that delays arose after a new project coordinator took charge in March 2011, because the new coordinator required time to become fully conversant with Bank procedures and other elements of managing Bank-financed projects. There were no significant changes in the project s design, targeting mechanism, and implementation arrangements. To account for the positive effect of extending the implementation period over additional cropping seasons and the availability of additional improved seed from producers, the key outcome indicators were revised upward. General oversight and direction for the project were the responsibility of the Project Steering Committee, which was specifically tasked with: (i) reviewing and approving the proposed consolidated Annual Work Plan and Budget; (ii) reviewing annual progress toward achieving the project s objective; and (iii) deciding on any corrective actions needed in relation to project implementation. Overall project coordination and technical responsibility rested with the Directorate General of ANPROCA, which was responsible for: (i) overall coordination and supervision of project activities; (ii) planning of activities, in close collaboration with CNOP-G, the National Directorate of Rural Engineering (Direction Nationale du Génie Rural, DNGR), and the National Directorate of Veterinary Services (Direction Nationale des Services Vétérinaires, DNSV); (iii) preparation and follow-up for the Annual Work Plan and Budget; (iv) satisfactory adherence to the Project Implementation Manual; (v) internal 6

19 monitoring of implementation and consolidation of monitoring and evaluation (M&E) activities; (vi) communication with the various stakeholders regarding the project; and (vii) the consolidation of progress reports into overall quarterly progress reports. Overall fiduciary management was ensured by the Fiduciary Unit of the World Bank funded Village Communities Support Project (PACV-2). To ensure close implementation support following the Bank s re-engagement, a consultant was hired to carry out regular implementation support missions. These missions took place on March 16-26, 2011; August 11-27, 2011, and November 21 to December 10, In addition, guidance from the Task Team Leader was sought by the project team whenever necessary. A fullfledged Bank supervision mission took place on June 22-29, Two stages of project implementation can be identified. In Stage 1, target quantities (of inputs procured and numbers of beneficiaries and hectares covered, for example) for the 2009/10 planting season were reduced in line with the resources available in the designated account (about US$ 2 million). All of the Stage 1 quantitative objectives were achieved with minimal Bank monitoring. The Koba research station produced about 28 tons of seed during the 2011/12 cropping season. Stage 2, with a budget of about US$ 3 million, started when disbursement resumed and the project was restructured in February Stage 2 covered the 2011/12 and 2012/13 seasons. Despite Bank support, agricultural inputs were not always delivered on time to producers, forcing them to postpone using those inputs until the subsequent cropping season. 22. The Project Coordination Unit procured farm inputs through competitive bidding and delivered them to CNOP-G, which was fully responsible for selling them on credit to producers at the government-subsidized rate. Producers were to reimburse the credit in cash after the harvest, and CNOP-G was also in charge of recovering input credits. CNOP-G s regional and local branches distributed the inputs. More specifically, CNOP- G (i) identified the demand for agricultural inputs from all producers or their associations; (ii) balanced the overall demand for inputs with the quantity available to determine the allocation of inputs for each region of the country; (iii) managed input sales points where uniform input prices were displayed; (iv) ensured that individual purchases were consistent with subsidized prices set by the government and did not exceed agreed upon ceilings per producer; (v) ensured that the proceeds from input sales were paid into bank accounts opened for that purpose; and (vi) kept records of all transactions to produce regular reports on the status of input distribution and credit recovery. Overall, CNOP-G carried out these functions as agreed. 23. As indicated, funds recovered at the end of the cropping season were lodged in a separate account managed by CNOP-G and used to capitalize a revolving fund for purchasing inputs in future seasons. The government reported a total amount recovered at project closing of about GNF 1,035,000,000. A manual clearly specifying the management and fiduciary procedures applicable to this revolving fund was unfortunately not prepared, however. The main reason for this omission was that the Government of Guinea did not view preparation of the manual as a priority and did not give it the importance it deserved during implementation. Terms of reference and an orientation note for the manual were prepared, but efforts never went beyond that stage owing to poor follow-up both from the project team and government. 7

20 24. The project awarded a contract to supply 1,000 tons of fertilizer, to be delivered by June Unfortunately, the selected firm was not able to deliver by the agreed date. To help resolve the problem, the government provided fertilizer from its own stocks to the project, with the understanding that it would be replaced through the project. The project could not launch a new competitive bidding process until January, 2012, however, because the decision to nullify the initial contract was taken by the government in December, Eventually a new supplier was selected, but the contract was not introduced for signing by the Minister of Finance until May, Since the project s closing date was in June, 2012, the firm did not have sufficient time to deliver the fertilizer even with the signed contract. Therefore, to avoid ineligible expenses, the Minister decided not to sign the contract. This second unfruitful procurement process led to an undisbursed balance at the end of the project because less fertilizer was procured than originally envisaged. At the same time, it is important to note that the project met the number of targeted beneficiaries as planned because of the 1,000 tons received from the government. 2.3 Monitoring and Evaluation Design, Implementation, and Utilization 25. M&E was to be carried out at two levels. The first (technical) level of M&E involved CNOP-G and regional staff of the National Directorate of Agriculture in tracking actual input use and results on farmers fields. Those data were to be transmitted to the National Office for Studies and Planning (Bureau de Stratégie et de Développement, BSD) for consolidation and reporting (the second level of M&E). CNOP-G also collected and maintained data on the distribution of inputs and cost recovery (although not in electronic form). It was mainly at the second level of M&E (the BSD) that the relevant monitoring activities were not undertaken. Instead, ANPROCA collected, processed, and reported data on yields and area, and the initial objective of involving an independent public institution like BSD, which had previously specialized in project M&E, was unsuccessful. This outcome partly explains why the results framework and component indicators, although well prepared, did not serve as a clear guide for monitoring and taking corrective action during implementation. For this reason, the performance of the M&E system under the project was rated Moderately Satisfactory. 2.4 Safeguard and Fiduciary Compliance 26. Safeguards are rated Moderately Satisfactory. From an environmental and social safeguards standpoint, the Guinea Emergency Agricultural Productivity Support Project was a Category B project. This classification implies that the project s environmental and social impacts, for the most part, were minimal, site-specific, and manageable to an accepted level. The project triggered two safeguard policies: the Environmental Assessment Policy (OP 4.01) and the Pest Management Policy (OP 4.09), based on its objectives of increasing agricultural production and productivity by providing certified seed, pesticide, and fertilizer to rice producers. The preparation and disclosure of the PMP was delayed due to OP In the meantime, the project adopted and implemented the already-disclosed PMP of the West Africa Agricultural Productivity Program (WAAPP 1-C) until a separate document was submitted to the Bank for review 8

21 and disclosure in February 2011 to ensure de jure compliance with the dated covenant in the Grant Agreement. 27. The PMP action plan recommended four categories of activities: (i) improvement of the institutional and legal framework, including support for preparation of a National Pest and Pesticides Management Plan; (ii) technical measures, including updating the inventory of pests affecting crops and stored farm products; (iii) training and capacitybuilding activities; and (iv) M&E of the action plan. Some of the mitigation activities were not carried out until the second stage of implementation (the 2011/12 cropping season). Of the four categories of activities just mentioned, mitigation activities focused mainly on training and capacity building for producers and extension agents. The project financed training related to the recommended best practices for storing fertilizer and pesticide, as well as on adequate and safe use of fertilizer and pesticide. Through the training, participants gained a better understanding of other mitigation measures included in the PMP, but the other three mitigation activities under the PMP (improvement of the institutional and legal framework, technical measures, M&E) did not receive sufficient attention during implementation. For this reason, the implementation of environmental and social safeguards under the project was rated Moderately Satisfactory. 28. Procurement is rated Moderately Satisfactory. Although procurement was envisaged to be completed shortly after effectiveness, the process took more time than necessary and deliveries of inputs to beneficiaries were delayed. For example, the target date for procuring 3,000 liters of herbicide and 2,000 liters of insecticide was September 19, 2008; the actual procurement date was December 5, Similarly, the target date for procuring 1,000 tons of fertilizer (urea and NPK) was November 26, 2011, and the actual date was April 11, The last fertilizer procurement under the project could not be completed before the closing date, leading to an undisbursed balance of about US$ 1,147,831. Nevertheless, the final review of project procurement confirmed that the Procurement Plan developed during preparation and updated during implementation was adequate. It also found that the filing of procurement documents was good and allowed procurement to be tracked easily. 29. Financial management is rated Satisfactory. The Project Coordination Unit of PACV-2 provided fiduciary oversight for the project, handling all financial, administrative, and accounting arrangements. The unit provided the required information to the Bank on financial management through quarterly Interim Financial Reports, which were of adequate quality and responsive to Bank recommendations. The final Interim Financial Report was received with no comment from the Bank. Taking the recommendations of the financial management assessment into account, the project provided the Project Coordination Unit with technical assistance in financial management and procurement by developing and adopting a Financial Management Manual, training staff, upgrading the accounting software, and mainstreaming it throughout the financial reporting system to track the use of Grant proceeds on a quarterly basis. The audit of the project account for 2011 was unqualified. 30. At closing, about 77 percent of Grant proceeds had been disbursed, with an undisbursed balance of US$ 1,147,831. A consultancy firm has been selected to conduct 9

22 an external audit of the project s Designated Account for handling Grant proceeds. The audit report will be submitted to the Bank by March 31, Post-completion Operation/Next Phase 31. The first Emergency Agricultural Productivity Support Project (Programme d Urgence d Appui à la Productivité Agricole, PUAPA-1) succeeded in expanding rice producers access to improved seed, fertilizer, and pesticide. The project also supported government-run emergency mechanisms to ensure the short-term distribution of those inputs and services, while strengthening the capacity of existing organizations (CNOP-G and ANPROCA). 32. Based on the lessons from implementing PUAPA-1, and considering that beneficiaries had highly valued the project s achievements, a second Emergency Agricultural Productivity Support Project (PUAPA-2), was financed from the Food Price Crisis Multi-Donor Response Trust Fund under the Global Food Crisis Response Program (GFRP) framework for a total of US$ 20 million. The development objective of this project is to improve the productivity and value-added of targeted commodities (rice, maize, cassava, and traditional poultry). The government has also committed its own resources to provide inputs to producers since the 2011/2012 cropping season. The experience under PUAPA was used to establish a national procedure for the distribution and cost recovery of inputs procured through public resources. 33. Aside from building on and consolidating activities initiated under PUAPA-1, PUAPA-2 supports the government s medium-term objectives in four ways. First, it targets the rehabilitation and sustainable management of about 3,620 hectares of smallholder irrigated rice to further enhance yields and increase the efficiency of input packages. Second, it intends to scale up the distribution of inputs to include smallholder maize and cassava producers in addition to producers of irrigated and rainfed rice. PUAPA-2 will rely on institutional arrangements piloted successfully under PUAPA-1 to provide a framework in which a sustainable, market-based mechanism can emerge for smallholders to access inputs. With the recently approved Policy and Human Resources Development grant for WAAPP-1C in Guinea (which supports rice productivity research and seed multiplication). PUAPA-2 is an important instrument for the World Bank to support Guinea s agricultural sector. 3. Assessment of Outcomes 3.1 Relevance of Objectives, Design, and Implementation 34. Designed as a response to the 2008 food crisis, the Emergency Agricultural Productivity Support Project supported the government s high-priority actions to enhance domestic food production by delivering critical inputs and advisory services. In this respect, the project s objectives were relevant and timely. 35. The Transitional Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (TPRSP) provides a clear statement of the government's commitment to poverty reduction. The TPRSP, an 10

23 extension of the full PRSP formulated in 2007, provides the framework for action toward poverty reduction in 2011/12. The poverty reduction strategy is based on three main pillars: (i) to sustain faster economic growth and create income-earning and employment opportunities, particularly for the rural poor; (ii) to improve and extend access to basic services; and (iii) to improve governance and strengthen institutional and human capacity. Agriculture and mining are expected to provide the key sources of growth. In agriculture, the objectives are to make better use of the large potential for expanding rice production, enhance food security through diversification and better extension services for smallholders, and foster agribusiness to increase processing and exportation of agricultural products (including non-traditional exports). 36. The Interim Strategy Note for 2011/12 was approved on March 24, The note supports the government s priorities of making agriculture a key engine of growth with an initial focus on food security and smallholder rice and food crop productivity to support the government s Priority Action Plan. Moreover, the project s focus on shortterm as well as medium-term food production fits well with the Country Poverty Reduction Strategy, which emphasizes measures to enhance domestic food production in the short, medium and long term to respond to rising food prices. Synergies and complementarities between World Bank supported projects were highlighted in the implementation design of the project and at the same time created a foundation for improved preparedness in the event of future food security threats. 37. The design of the project was also consistent with the broader objectives of the GFRP, which were to: (i) reduce the negative impact of high and volatile food prices on the lives of the poor in a timely way; (ii) support governments in the design of sustainable policies that mitigate the adverse impact of high and more volatile food prices on poverty while minimizing the creation of long-term market distortions; and (iii) support broadbased growth, productivity, and market participation in agriculture to ensure an adequate and sustainable food supply response. 3.2 Achievement of Project Development Objectives Rating: Satisfactory 38. The overall achievement of the PDO is Satisfactory. The development objective was to increase smallholder rice productivity on 35,000 hectares. The project aimed at mitigating the short-term impact of increased food prices on households and expanding food crop farmers access to agricultural inputs in the medium and long term. This development objective was to be achieved by expanding food crop producers access to improved seed, fertilizer, pesticide, and advisory services. Specific key outcomes envisioned for this project included an increase in rice yields by 50 percent and reaching about 90,250 direct beneficiaries. 39. Increase in rice yields of targeted smallholders: Achieved. Data collected during the impact evaluation from a sample of farmers across agro-ecological zones indicate that rice yields increased by 96 percent against the target of 50 percent. Surveys conducted on beneficiaries plots within the framework of the WAAPP-1C baseline study showed yield increases of 138 percent in Lower Guinea (from 1.3 to 2.8 tons per hectare), 11

24 60 percent in Upper Guinea (from 1.5 to 2.4 tons per hectare), and 92 percent in Forest Guinea (from 1.3 to 2.5 tons per hectare) for producers using the recommended technologies. 40. Number of direct beneficiaries reached by the project: Achieved. Field data indicate that the target number of beneficiaries was reached. Against a target of 90,250 producers, the actual number of direct beneficiaries was 110,000 producers. 41. The achievement of intermediate performance indicators is assessed below for the three technical components of the project. 42. Production, certification, purchase, and storage of base seed by research stations for multiplication: Partially Achieved. During the 2009/10 and 2011/12 cropping season, about 45 tons of foundation seed were produced against a target of 60 tons. The Koba research station was not able to produce foundation seed during the 2008/09 season because of factors beyond its control (floods hampered seed production). During 2011/12, the government allocated exceptional funding out of its own budget to support IRAG s entire foundation seed production activity. In the end, the project had more seed for onward multiplication by seed producers than the 45 tons procured out of the Grant proceeds. 43. Production of improved seed by producers: Achieved. During the 2009/10 and 2011/12 cropping seasons, about 2,600 tons of improved seed were produced against a target of 2,300 tons. 44. Training in seed multiplication for producers: Achieved. During the 2009/10 and 2011/12 cropping seasons, about 250 producers were trained in seed multiplication against a target of Procurement of fertilizer: Partially Achieved. During the 2009/10 and 2011/12 cropping seasons, about 1,400 tons of fertilizer were purchased against a target of 2,000 tons. However, the government provided 1,000 tons of its own stocks, which meant that 2,400 tons of fertilizer were ultimately available for the project. 46. Distribution of improved input packages and provision of advisory services to producers: Achieved. Against a target of 90,250 producers, the actual number of beneficiaries of input packages and advisory services was about 110,000 producers. The project significantly increased rice producers access to improved inputs and advisory services. For example, the average distance to travel to get improved seed dropped from 16 kilometers to 2 kilometers, while for herbicide and fertilizer, the average distance is 3 kilometers compared to 21 kilometers without the project. Moreover, the project promoted producers awareness of the importance of using inputs of good quality (improved seed, fertilizer, and pesticide). 47. Tables 1 and 2 summarize progress against the PDO indicators and intermediate outcome indicators, respectively. In many cases, the project performed above targets. 12

25 Table 1: Achievement of Key PDO Indicators Key PDO Indicators Unit Baseline Targeted Value 1 (a) Percent increase in rice yields of targeted smallholders 2 (b) Number of direct project beneficiaries Values Realized by June 30, 2012, and Comments % (192% of the target) Persons 0 90, ,000 (122% of the target) 13

26 Table 2: Achievement of Key Intermediate Outcome Indicators Key Intermediate Outcome Indicators 1 Quantity of base seed produced by research stations purchased, certified, and stocked 2 Quantity of improved seed produced by seed producers purchased, certified, and stocked 3 Number of producers receiving seed multiplication training Unit Baseline Targeted Value Realized Values, June, , and Comments Tons (75% of the target) Tons 0 2,300 2,600 (113% of the target) Persons (100% of the target) 4 Quantity of fertilizer procured Tons 0 2,000 1,400 (70% of target) 5 Number of producers receiving improved input packages and adequate advisory services Persons 0 90, ,000 (122% of the target) 3.3 Efficiency 48. As stated in the Project Appraisal Document, no cost-benefit analysis was conducted prior to the project, given its emergency nature and short preparation period. However, the economic impact of providing improved seed, fertilizer, pesticide, and advisory services to farmers was positive. Aside from being procured and delivered to rice producers, the subsidized inputs provided through the project were procured at half the prevailing market price. 49. The impact of rice producers access to improved seed, fertilizer, pesticide, and advisory services was significant in the short term. Without access to improved inputs, production remains essentially at the subsistence level and yields little if any marketable surplus. The advisory services provided under the project enabled farmers to use fertilizer and improved seed more effectively. 50. An ex post farm budget analysis, based on farm survey data, found that on average the project generated significant financial benefits for producers (Annex 3). In the absence of the project, average rice yields range from 1 to 4 tons per hectare, and the average net income per hectare is GNF 8,500,000 (1,146,100 16,300,000). Under the project, however, average rice yields ranged from 2 to 5 tons per hectare, and the average net income per hectare was GNF 11,000,000 (2,670,000 19,862,500). 51. These results show that the incremental benefits derived from yield increases outweigh the additional costs incurred by producers. When fertilizer and pesticide are valued at the market price rather than the project s subsidized price, however, the net income for rice producers under the project remains positive for the best performers but becomes negative for some producers. The implication is that there is still room to improve productivity. 14